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CHAPTER 1: PRELIMINARY ISSUES  
1.1 Introduction 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 
(hereafter “CISG”), has been considered the most successful attempt at a uniform substantive 
contractual law.1 Its success can be attributed to several reasons. One such reason is based on 
the fact that more and more international sale contracts embody the CISG as a either a choice 
of law, or by virtue of the conventions applications parties to the contracts have their place of 
business in contracting states to the Convention2 or the private international law rules lead to 
the law of a contracting state to the CISG.3   Another reason can be attributed to the fact that as 
of 26 September 2014 it has exactly 83 contracting states4 as opposed to it predecessor5 which 
only had nine.6 A final reason would be the ever increasing utilization and interpretation of the 
Convention by domestic courts.7  However despite its successes, the CISG remains vague in 
various aspects. This is due to compromise between Common law and Civil law countries, 
during its negotiating phase.8 For the purpose of this dissertation, the vagueness revolves 
around the question, if whether Article 79 permits an exemption based on the delivery of non-
conforming goods? 
 
Article 79 operates as a force majeure clause, effectively affording a party who has not 
performed any of his respective obligations, due to an impediment beyond his control, of which 
he could not have reasonably taken into account at time of the conclusion of the contract, the 
opportunity to escape liability for contractual damages. Note that the innocent party may still 
invoke, all other available remedies due to the fact that the defaulting party is still in breach of 
contract. 9 Nevertheless, if the requirements are satisfied under Article 79, then the innocent 
party may not claim damages.   
 
                                                 
1 Loukas Mistelis ‘CISG-Advisory Council: CISG-AC Publishes First Opinions’ (1997) 1. 
2 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980, Art. 1(1)(a) (hereafter 
“CISG”) 
3 CISG, Art. 1(1)(b). 
4 CISG: Table of Contracting States available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html accessed 
on 18 June 2015. 
5 The Uniform Law on the formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1964 (hereafter “ULFIS”) 
and the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods 1973 (hereafter “ULIS”). 
6 Ingeborg Schwenzer and Pascal Hachem ‘The CISG – Successes and Pitfalls’ (2009) 459. 
7 Peter Huber & Alastair Mullis The CISG: a new textbook for students and practitioners (2007) 1. 
8 CISG-AC Opinion No. 7 ‘Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG’ Available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op7.html. Accessed on 20 July 2015. 
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According to recent jurisprudence, courts decisions have allowed for various Article 79 
excuses typically under: ‘A seller’s late delivery of goods, a buyer’s late payment of the price, 
a buyer’s failure to take delivery after paying the price.’10 On one occasion, a French court has 
even granted the exemption based on a sellers inability to produce conforming goods.11 
However despite this fact scholars continually debate if whether the CISG allows for such an 
exemption. Accordingly, Alejandro Garro once stated that, 
  
‘There are issues under Article 79 that, either as a result of flexibility in the language of the provision and 
an unusual level of ambivalence in its drafting history, leave courts and arbitrators with significant 
leeway when applying Article 79 to the facts before them.’12  
 
 He further cautions the use of any survey of reported decisions, due to that fact that the 
number of cases decided under Article 79 provides few interpretive conclusion to be drawn.13 
This is due to the fact that, despite the few cases of success under Article 79, there exists even 
more claims that have been denied.14  
 
In my analysis of the research on this particular topic, I had discovered, that one prominent 
scholar had argued from the point of view of the intention of the Drafters, essentially the 
legislative intent. The other CISG Advisory Council Member had argued from a purely textual 
approach based on the wording of the provision of Article 79.15 Therefore I am of the view that 
if we funnel these arguments through an interpretive guide, we will be left with a determination 
as to which should be preferred. This will indicate if whether we should include or exclude the 
delivery of non-conforming goods as an excuse for the purposes of Article 79.  
 
With due regard given to the above paragraph, this dissertation contains five chapters. The first 
chapter contains a brief drafting history of the CISG and Article 79, in which I seek to illustrate 
that the challenges of compromise have resulted in the creation of a vague and plastic norms.16 
                                                                                                                                                           
9 CISG, Art. 79(5) and Joseph Lookofsky Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (2012) 
186. 
10 Uncitral Uncitral Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
(2008) 253. 
11 (Flippe Christian v. Douet Sport Collections) - Tribunal de Commerce de Besanҫon, France, 19 January 1998, 
unlex. Available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980119f1.html accessed on 20 July 2015. 
12 CISG-AC Opinion No. 7 ‘Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG’ Available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op7.html. Accessed on 20 July 2015. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15 See Chapter 3 at 3.2 and 3.3. 
16 Harry Flechtner ‘Gedenkschrift In Honor Of E. Allan Farnsworth (1928-2005): Article: Article 79 Of The 
United Nations Convention On Contracts For The International Sale Of Goods (CISG) As Rorschach test: The 
Homeward Trend And Exemption For Delivering Non-Conforming Goods’ (2009) 2. 
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The second chapter will illustrate the components of Article 79, which essentially embodies the 
requirements necessary for the utilization thereof and the issues presented under each 
requirement. The Third chapter will bring to light the debate as to whether non-conformity 
exists as an excuse. Within chapter three, I will illustrate the importance of the Advisory 
Council, the arguments presented by the relevant scholars and Advisory Council members as to 
the current debate, and finally the current state of affairs with regard to non-conformity of 
goods and Article 79. Chapter four is the crux of this dissertation, within this chapter I will use 
the relevant arguments, funneled through the applicable interpretive guides in order to ascertain 
if whether from a legal interpretative vantage point, an answer may be derived. Furthermore I 
will explain the internal interpretive rules embodied under Article 7 of the CISG. The fifth and 
final chapter will be a summing up of all the relevant points as well as recommendations.  
1.2 Drafting History of the CISG and Article 79 
1.2.1 Drafting History Which Lead to the Creation of the CISG 
Initially, one has to understand that the CISG was not the first attempt at a uniform 
international sale law. These first attempts were established by the International institute for the 
Unification of Private law (hereafter “UNIDROIT”) and the Hague Conference for Private 
International Law (Hereafter The Hague Conference).17 Later an attempt by the United Nations 
Commission on the International Trade law (hereafter “UNCITRAL”) saw the creation of a 
uniform international sales law, as we know it today, the CISG. 
 
1.2.1.1 UNIDROIT and The Hague Conference’s Attempts at a Uniform International 
Sales Law 
In 1928, the Austrian scholar, Ernst Rabel18 led the world on the path to a uniform international 
sales law, it was he who had motioned to the newly created UNIDOIT institute that such a 
creation would be a beneficial first project.19 Note that UNIDROIT had been established in 
1926 and was founded in Rome.20    
 
                                                 
17 Huber & Mullis op cit (n7) 2. 
18 Schwenzer and Hachem op cit (n6) 459. ‘Ernst Rabel was the first scholar to report on the possibility of sales 
law unification, based on his work a committee consisting of representatives from various legal systems had been 
founded. Of which we saw the creation of the first draft of uniform sales law in 1935. Later in 1936 Rabel 
published the first volume of his works on   uniform sales law, titled ‘ das Recht des warenkaufs” which provided 
a broad comparative analysis of the status quo of sales law.’  
19 Huber & Mullis op cit (n7) 2. 
20 Schwenzer and Hachem op cit (n6) 459. 
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However it was not until after the Second World War that we see the creation of a Special 
Sales Commission which had been appointed by the conference in The Hague.21 The 
responsibility of this Special Sales Commission was to further the unification of international 
sales law, a process initially started by Ernst Rabel.22 It was this Commission that inevitably 
created the first two drafts of uniform international sales law, these drafts, subsequently 
adopted were known as the: The Uniform Law on the formation of Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (hereafter “ULFIS”) and the Uniform Law on the International 
Sale of Goods (hereafter “ULIS”) .23 These predecessors of the CISG had entered into force in 
1972, however both Hague Conventions existed as a failed attempt at uniform international 
sales law, for the reason that both had failed to muster the requisite attention by the 
international community to be ratified and applied.24 As a result the Hague Conventions had 
not met the high hopes and expectations, shared by all the interested parties.25 It was during the 
time that ULFIS and the ULIS had been struggling to receive the appropriate number of 
member state ratifications, that UNCITRAL had been established in 1966.26  
 
1.2.1.2 UNCITRAL and the Creation of the CISG  
It was due to the failures of the Hague Conventions and after consultations with the member 
states of the United Nations, that UNCITRAL had decided to establish a working group to try 
modify the Hague Conventions or create a new convention that would have a much better 
chance at receiving international acceptance.27   
 
The choice is however obvious, the Working Group had decided to create the New York Draft 
Convention, which had later been modified several times before it had been adopted in 1980.28 
The New York Draft Convention ‘covered specific rules on sales as well as the formation of 
the sales contract’29. This inevitably means that the New York Draft Convention is the Draft 
Convention that became the CISG. Article 99 of the CISG mandated that the Convention 
would only come into force upon the ‘deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession, including an instrument which contained a declaration made 
                                                 
21 Huber & Mullis op cit (n7) 3. 
22 Schwenzer and Hachem op cit (n6) 459. 
23 Huber & Mullis op cit (n7) 3. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Schwenzer and Hachem op cit (n6) 459. 
26 Huber & Mullis op cit (n7) 3. And ‘Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL’ available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html accessed on 24 August 2015. 
27 Huber & Mullis op cit (n7) 3. 
28 Ibid.  
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under Article 92’.30 On 11 December 1986, the mandated threshold, as established under 
Article 99, had been met and subsequently the CISG came into force on the 1 January 1988.31  
 
It is no secret that the creation of this new convention has gained sufficient international 
attention and as a result it can be stated that the Working Group had successfully accomplished 
their goal, which is evident based on the success as illustrated in the introductory paragraph.32  
 
1.2.2 Drafting History of Article 79 
When one speaks of the drafting history of Article 79 of the CISG, essentially one is in fact 
referring to the travaux Préparatoires. It has been stated that the overabundance and 
disorganised nature of travaux préparatoires primarily made the legislative history of the CISG 
particularly difficult to navigate.33 Nonetheless, this is not the position today.34 
 
However for the purposes of a discussion on the drafting history of Article 79, I turn to the 
works of the Late Advisory Council Member and scholar, Peter Schlechtriem, in his 
commentary on Article 79.35 Of all the available commentary on the drafting history of article 
79, his seems to be the most thorough.  
  
First of all it has to be highlighted that Article 79, for all intents and purposes, exists as a 
revised version of Article 74 of the ULIS.36 Peter Schlechtriem notes that the reason for the 
revision was due to the fact that Article 74 of the ULIS had been criticised during the Working 
Group discussions, for making it ‘too easy for the promisor to excuse his non-performance of 
the contract’37. Therefore various members of the Working Group were all for making the 
                                                                                                                                                           
29 Huber & Mullis op cit (n7) 3. 
30 CISG, Art. 99(1). 
31 Schwenzer and Hachem op cit (n6) 459 and 460. 
32 See Chapter 1 at 1.1. 
33 ‘Roadmap to the legislative history of CISG Article 79’ available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/roadmap/intro-79.html accessed on 25 May 2015 
34 ‘Roadmap to the legislative history of CISG Article 79’ available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/roadmap/intro-79.html accessed on 25 May 2015. ‘Our response is navigation 
aids (pilots) to identify paths and shoals (caveats) -- roadmaps for each Article of the CISG’. 
35 Peter Schlechtriem Commentary on the UN convention on the international sale of goods 2ed (1998). 
36 Joern Rimke ‘Force majeure and hardship: Application in international trade practice  with specific regard to the 
CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles  of International Commercial Contracts’ (2000) available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rimke.html accessed on 29 August 2015. 
37 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 601. 
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provision more objective.38 It also has to be noted that the scope of Article 74 was quite broad, 
it not only covered situations of ‘physical or legal impossibility or circumstances which 
fundamentally altered the character of the performance owed’39 but also covered situations 
where performance had suddenly become more difficult.40  
 
Peter Schlechtriem then continues to explain that, despite the fact that the Working Group had 
decided to alter the wording of the provision, they could not however decide on what wording 
should have been adopted.41 As a result they created two alternatively worded drafts as options. 
The first alternative (Alternative A) was the Provisional Alternative.42 Which stated that, there 
would be no liability to pay damages, only in a situation that had occurred, but was not due to 
the fault of the promisor and where performance had become impossible or the situation 
changed the nature of the performance.43 Inevitably this meant that the expected performance 
under the contract would not be rendered, but in its stead, a new and different performance 
would be due.44 In this situation fault was presumed and the onus rested on the promisor to 
prove one of three things: first, that he could not have taken the situation into account, or 
secondly that he could not avoid the situation or finally that there was no way to overcome this 
situation. It also contained a provision similar to that of the current Article 79, that the promisor 
is under an obligation to notify the promisee of the impediment.45  
 
The second alternative (Alternative B), was significantly different from the Provisional 
Alternative, it provided that any impediment, that could not have been taken into consideration 
by the parties at the time of conclusion of the contract or in the case of which it had already 
occurred and could not have been avoided or overcome thereafter, would exist as an 
exemption.46 Like the Provisional Alternative, it also catered for the notification to the 
promisee, however the way in which they differed was that Alternative B afforded the injured 
                                                 
38 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 601. And Joern Rimke ‘Force majeure and hardship: Application in international trade 
practice  with specific regard to the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles  of International Commercial Contracts’ 
(2000) available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rimke.html accessed on 29 August 2015. 
39 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 601. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 601. And Joern Rimke ‘Force majeure and hardship: Application in international trade 
practice  with specific regard to the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles  of International Commercial Contracts’ 
(2000) available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rimke.html accessed on 29 August 2015. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 601. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. 
46Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 601. 
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party the remedies of avoiding the contract or a reduction of the purchase price, provided that 
the impediment was not due to their act.47 
 
Ultimately, the Working Group adopted a version primarily premised on the Provisional 
Alternative but included the use of the term “impediment” in Alternative B.48 This meant that if 
a party to the contract had not performed any of their obligations under the contract, that party 
would not be liable to pay damages provided that, the defaulting party met certain 
requirements.49 These requirements are expressed as follows: that the above situation was due 
to an impediment and furthermore that the impediment was not due to the fault of the 
defaulting party.50 Schlechtriem therefore, draws the reader’s attention to the fact that fault was 
presumed, unless the defaulting party could prove that situation met the further criteria of 
impossible performance and the like expressed within the Provisional Alternative as explained 
above.51 This version was adopted as Article 50 of the Geneva Draft of 1976.52 
 
Later upon reformulating the ground for the exception under Article 51 of the Vienna Draft, it 
was decided that the no fault requirement should be abandoned and in its stead we see the 
importation of the phrase ‘impediment beyond his control’.53 This shift would essentially see 
the inclusion of an objective test.54  
 
Additionally we also see a second alteration, which was an insertion of the sentence that we 
effectively know as Article 79(5), this meant that, the innocent party could now claim any other 
remedy available under the convention except damages.55 This was however qualified by the 
fact that there had been no consensus for the remedy of claiming specific performance where 
the due performance had become impossible.56 Moreover, the concept ‘sub-contractor’ under 
paragraph (2) was replaced by the phrase ‘a person whom has engaged to perform the whole or 
a part of the contract’. Lastly under paragraph (4) the drafting parties decided to make it clear 
                                                 
47 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 602. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Joern Rimke ‘Force majeure and hardship: Application in international trade practice  with specific regard to the 
CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles  of International Commercial Contracts’ (2000) available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rimke.html accessed on 29 August 2015. 
53 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 602. 
54 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 601. And Joern Rimke ‘Force majeure and hardship: Application in international trade 
practice  with specific regard to the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles  of International Commercial Contracts’ 
(2000) available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rimke.html accessed on 29 August 2015. 
55 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 602. 
56 Ibid.  
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that the promisor completed his obligation to inform the promisee, only when the notice arrives 
within a reasonable time, non-receipt was therefore placed squarely on the promisors shoulders. 
 
Finally Peter Schlechtriem, reflected the difficulties that the delegates of the Working Group 
had as to the interpretation of the provisions after the completion of the final draft.57 An 
example of which would be with respect to paragraph (5), which the  Federal Republic of 
Germany  proposed that its wording should be made clear to the fact that the right to claim 
specific performance could not be insisted upon, if the impediment was a continuing one.58 
However certain parties objected to this, due to the fact that, the question was more than just a 
clarification of law.59 It embodied a technical question as well.60 It was understood that the 
removal of right to performance would prejudice the other accessory rights of the promisee and 
basically, despite the fact that the impediment had occurred, it was the obligation of the 
promisor, nevertheless, to try and overcome such impediment and perform.61 
 
Furthermore The Norwegian proposed that under paragraph (3), the promisor should be 
released of his duty to perform, even though the impediment was temporary, if the impediment 
radically changed the nature of the promisor’s due performance.62 It was rejected for the reason 
that essentially this introduced a Théorie de l’imprévisionin63 into the convention. 
Consequently both The German proposal and Norwegian proposal were rejected.64 
 
Ultimately the reflection of compromise during the drafting stages, for the purpose of non-
conformity of goods existing as an excusable exemption, is evident within Peter Schlechtriem’s 
arguments on the issue at hand.65 Note that this will be discussed in much greater depth.66 
                                                 
57 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 602 and 603. 
58 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 603. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Dionysios Flambouras ‘Comparative Remarks on CISG Article 79 & PECL Articles 6:111, 8:108’ (2002) 
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/peclcomp79.html accessed on 29 August 2015, Joern Rimke 
‘Force majeure and hardship: Application in international trade practice  with specific regard to the CISG and the 
UNIDROIT Principles  of International Commercial Contracts’ (2000) available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rimke.html accessed on 29 August 2015.And Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 
602 and 603. ‘Effectively, the promisor would be released from his obligations the minute the impediment made 
the obligation more difficult.’ 
64 Joern Rimke ‘Force majeure and hardship: Application in international trade practice  with specific regard to the 
CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles  of International Commercial Contracts’ (2000) available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rimke.html accessed on 29 August 2015. 
65 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 606. 
66 See Chapter 3. 
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However, briefly, Peter Schlechtriem argues that the term “impediment” as evident under 
Article 79 is a fundamental shift from the use of the term “circumstance” under Article 74 of 
the ULIS.67 Impediment encompasses a situation that essentially restricts the promisor’s scope 
of activities. Additionally, the term “circumstances” under The Hague Convention, replaced the 
term “obstacle”.68 It was understood that the term “obstacle” would encompass the fact that 
only external events would be capable of being excused.69  
 
With regard to the above, it has to be noted that effectively ‘The compromise nature of Article 
79 has led commentators to question whether the rules it establishes provide real clarity for 
parties to a commercial transaction.’ 70  As the drafting history of the CISG particularly Article 
79 suggests that, it had taken a considerable amount of thought and logic to arrive at a mutual 
solution as to the terms applicable. However, with regard to the drafting history, the mutual 
solution derived at, although it embodies consensus, this consensus embodies compromise 
which had led, nevertheless, to the creation of vague provisions.71 One such provision being if 
whether the promisor is capable of claiming non-conformity of goods delivered as an 
exemption under Article 79, due to the fact that the supplying of conforming goods essentially 
exists as one of the promisor’s fundamental obligations.     
 
CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING ARTICLE 79: A 
LOOK INTO ITS COMPONENTS, REQUIREMENTS 
AND AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES   
 
Initially it has to be understood that Articles 45(1) and 61(1) collectively sets out the no fault 
liability principle contained in the CISG. Together they state that if either the seller or the 
buyer fails to perform any obligations due under the contract or those set forth under the 
convention, that either party may then exercise any rights72 provided under the convention or 
                                                 
67 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 606. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Franco Ferrari, Harry Fletcher & Ronald A. Brand (eds) The Draft Uncitral Digest & Beyond: Cases, Analysis 
& Unsolved issues in the UN Sales Convention (2004) 394. 
71 Flechtner op cit (n16) 2. 
72 CISG, Art. 45(1) ‘remedies available to the [buyer] are contained in Articles 46 to 52’ and under CISG, Art. 
61(1) ‘remedies available to the [seller] are contained in Articles 62 to 65’. 
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claim damages73. Consequently, Article 79 effectively operates as a limited exception to the 
no-fault liability principle as set forth.74 
 
It has also been mentioned that Article 79 must be read together with Article 80, as Article 80 
also forms part of Chapter V, Section IV of Part III of the CISG, titled “Exemptions”.75 Article 
80 states that,  
 
‘A party may not rely on a failure of the other party to perform, to the extent that such failure was caused 
by the first party's act or omission.’ 
 
 In essence Article 80 can also operate so as to alleviate a party of the consequences incurred, 
due to the fact that, they had failed to perform, by virtue of the fact that the other party had 
caused the failed performance.76 
 
2.1 Components of Article 79 
Article 79 has been divided into five paragraphs and reads as follows: 
 
(1) A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was due 
to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the 
impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or 
its consequences. 
 
(2) If the party's failure is due to the failure by a third person whom he has engaged to perform the whole 
or a part of the contract, that party is exempt from liability only if: 
 
(a) he is exempt under the preceding paragraph; and 
 
(b) The person whom he has so engaged would be so exempt if the provisions of that 
paragraph were applied to him. 
 
(3) The exemption provided by this Article has effect for the period during which the impediment exists. 
 
(4) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the impediment and its effect on 
his ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other party within a reasonable time after the 
party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the impediment, he is liable for damages 
resulting from such non-receipt. 
 
(5) Nothing in this Article prevents either party from exercising any right other than to claim damages 
under this Convention. 
 
                                                 
73 ‘Under Article 45(1) and Article 61(1) the claims for damages are collectively contained in Articles 74 to 77’. 
74 Lookofsky op cit (n9) 186. 
75 ‘ANNOTATED TEXT OF CISG Article 80’ Available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text-80.html 
accessed on 29 June 2015. 
76 ‘Section IV of Part III, Chapter V Exemption (Articles 79-80)’ available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/digest2008/p3_ch5_s4_overview.pdf accessed on 29 June 2015, see 
overview. 
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John Honnold, under an analysis of Article 79, states that it is preferable to start with 
paragraphs (1) and (5), because paragraphs (2) – (4) deals specifically with special situations.77 
Accordingly, I will follow this approach. 
 
Paragraph (1) illustrates the necessary requirements that need to be met by the party seeking 
the exemption.78 The requirements will be discussed later within this chapter.79 Jacob Ziegel 
makes two very important observations with regard to paragraph (1): first that ‘the existence of 
a qualifying impediment to non-performance does not "frustrate" or automatically terminate the 
contract’80 and his second observation lends itself to the manner in which the defaulting party 
addresses the impediment. This means that the subsequent ‘impediment’ must not only be 
beyond his control but furthermore he must show that he could not have taken the impediment 
into consideration at the time of the conclusion of the contract or have avoided it or overcome 
the impediment or its consequences.81Additionally, it is my view that, paragraph (1) effectively 
exists as a chapeau82, illustrating that all the other paragraphs are subject to the requirements 
contained within. 
 
Paragraph (5) on the other hand concerns the consequence of non-performance and expresses 
the remedies available to the innocent party.83 Upon a closer reading it affords either party the 
right to use any other remedy available84 except, claiming damages. One can therefore draw a 
relationship between paragraphs (1) and (5), which is that, when a party fails to perform any 
obligations as considered under paragraph (1) but satisfies the requirements contained within, 
                                                 
77 John Honnold ‘Article 79 impediments excusing parties from damage ("Force Majeure")’ available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ho79.html accessed on 12 March 2015 see §423.4 (2) The Convention. 
78 Joseph Lookofsky ‘The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ 
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/loo79.html accessed on 24 June 2015. And Secretariat 
Commentary ‘GUIDE TO CISG ARTICLE 79’ available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-79.html accessed on 24 June 2015. 
79 See Chapter 2 at 2.2. 
80 Jacob S. Ziegel ‘Report to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods’ (1981) available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/ziegel79.html accessed on 1 
July 2015. 
81 Ibid.  
82http://unterm.un.org/dgaacs/unterm.nsf/8fa942046ff7601c85256983007ca4d8/99954c21bccf56e185257156006f
0e6b?OpenDocument accessed on 1 July 2015 ‘French word used in English-language documents at the UN to 
refer to an introductory paragraph to a convention or other legal text or to a heading… Note, however, that "un 
chapeau" is a separate entity from the story itself and is intended above all to summarize or announce the story; … 
[note that within a legal context it would be the most important part of the provision upon which all other 
provisions depend, in the case of Article 79 it is paragraph (1) which embodies the requirements necessary to fulfil 
an exemption under any of the other paragraphs]’. 
83 Jacob S. Ziegel ‘Report to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods’ (1981) available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/ziegel79.html accessed on 1 
July 2015. 
84 See n72 and n73 ‘these remedies are: Specific performance, Avoidance of the contract, Suspension of 
performance and with regard to its non-applicability under Article 79, Damages’. 
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the other party may not claim damages as a result, however the use of their other remedies 
remain available.85 Furthermore, the contract is not automatically terminated, in order for the 
contract to be terminated, the innocent party must rely on the remedy of avoidance.86  
 
Additionally it is my view that paragraph (5) is a single phrase that houses two consequences, 
the first is that, if the seller satisfies the requirements of Article 79 then he can be excused from 
paying contractual damages. However, based on the way in which paragraph (5) is phrased, 
even if the seller satisfies the requirements, the buyer is not barred from relying on any of the 
other remedies available to him, this is the second consequence. The remedies of the buyer are: 
‘specific performance (Art. 46 CISG), Avoidance of the contract (Art. 49 CISG), Reduction of 
the purchase price (Art. 50 CISG) [and taking into consideration of Article 79, with the 
exclusion of] Damages (Art. 45(1)(b), Art. 74 et seq. CISG)’87.  
 
Paragraph (2) indicates the special situation in which performance under the contract comes 
from a third person. It further illustrates a relationship between itself and paragraph (1) stating 
that with regard to such a special circumstance, the exemption is only applicable if the 
defaulting party88 or the Third person89 would satisfy the requirements under paragraph (1). 
Barry Nicholas states that paragraph (2) is essentially a new innovation that cannot be found 
under any other authority.90 He further notes that the purpose for which paragraph (2) was 
created was to limit the reliance on Article 79 due to the failure of a third party to provide the 
due performance.91 
 
Paragraph (3) is fairly straight forward, it simply illustrates that the exemption only available as 
long as the impediment exists. This in my view limits the availability of Article 79, to the life-
                                                 
85 John Honnold ‘Article 79 impediments excusing parties from damage ("Force Majeure")’ available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ho79.html accessed on 12 March 2015 see §423.4 (2) The Convention. 
86 Jacob S. Ziegel ‘Report to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods’ (1981) available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/ziegel79.html accessed on 1 
July 2015. 
87 Huber & Mullis op cit (n7) 179. 
88 CISG, Art. 79(2)(a). 
89 CISG, Art. 79(2)(b). 
90 Barry Nicholas ‘Impracticability and impossibility in the U.N. Convention on contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods’ 21. Available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas1.html#504 accessed on 1 July 
2015 ‘to the notion of authority he refers to the ULIS and he also asserts that he assumes within various domestic 
legislation however he had not done a detailed enquiry’. 
91 Barry Nicholas ‘Impracticability and impossibility in the U.N. Convention on contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods’ available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas1.html#504 accessed on 1 July 2015. 
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span of the impediment.92   Therefore logically speaking, once the impediment ceases to exist, 
the obligations of the party claiming an exemption should concurrently be reinstated.93  
  
Finally paragraph (4), places an obligation on the defaulting party to notify the innocent party. 
This is due to the fact that, the innocent party should be afforded the opportunity to take the 
necessary steps to overcome the consequences of said non-performance.94   Note that the 
notification is effective upon receipt by the innocent party.95 Furthermore the obligation of 
notifying, is only appropriate when the existence of the impediment is certain, therefore it has 
to be understood that if the impediment is impending, then as per paragraph (1), the 
responsibility to take the necessary steps to avoid the impediment is squarely placed on the 
shoulder of the soon to be defaulting party.96  
 
This provision also encompasses the concept of reasonableness, due to the fact that notice must 
be given within a reasonable time period.97 The concept of reasonableness is a general principle 
routed in the CISG as a whole.98 The concept of reasonableness used during the CISG’s 
drafting is essentially equivalent to that contained in  Article 1:30299 of the Principles of 
European Contract Law 2002 (hereafter “PECL”).100  The PECL has received its concept of 
reasonableness, with regard to the domestic provisions contained within both Civil law and 
Common law jurisdictions.101 It states that, when assessing reasonableness, one has to take into 
account, if whether a person in the same position, acting in good faith would consider the 
action reasonable?102 Accompanying this definition, it goes further to state that one should look 
at what is reasonable with regard to the nature and purpose of the contract, the circumstances of 
                                                 
92  Peter Schlechtriem ‘Uniform Sales Law - The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods’available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem-79.html accessed on 2 July 2015 ‘a 
temporary impediment may be excused but only for the length of its duration’. 
93 Secretariat Commentary ‘GUIDE TO CISG ARTICLE 79’ available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-79.html accessed on 24 June 2015. 
94 Denis Tallon, in Bianca-Bonell ‘Commentary on the International Sales Law’ (1987) available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tallon-bb79.html accessed on 2 July 2015. 
95 Peter Schlechtriem ‘Uniform Sales Law - The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ 
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem-79.html accessed on 2 July 2015. 
96 Denis Tallon ‘Bianca-Bonell Commentary on the International Sales Law’ (1987) available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tallon-bb79.html accessed on 2 July 2015. 
97 Ibid. 
98 http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text-79.html accessed on 2 July 2015 at ‘definition of reasonableness’. 
99 The Principles of European Contract Law 2002 (hereafter “PECL”), Art. 1:302 (ex art. 1.108) – 
‘Reasonableness  Under these Principles reasonableness is to be judged by what persons acting in good faith  and 
in the same situation as the parties would consider to be reasonable. In particular, in assessing what is reasonable 
the nature and purpose of the contract, the circumstances of the case, and the usages and practices of the trades or 
professions involved should be taken into account’. 
100 http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text-79.html accessed on 2 July 2015 at ‘definition of reasonableness’. 
101 ‘Definition of reasonableness recited in the PECL’ available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/reason.html#def accessed on 2 July 2015. 
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the particular case and finally what would be considered reasonable within the specific usages 
and trade practices.103  
 
Finally, the wording of paragraph (4) seems to illustrate a kind of deviation from paragraph (5), 
for the fact that if the defaulting party fails to notify timeously, he will then be liable to pay 
damages with regard to the non-receipt of the notification.104  Note that the deviation expressed 
is for the payment of damages for the failure to notify and not the payment of damages within 
the context of non-performance, so essentially the payment of damages does not operate the 
same as within the two.105 
 
2.2 Requirements Necessary to Satisfy an Exemption under 
Article 79 
Based on the available literature, although it appears that the various scholars seem to lead in 
similar directions as to the interpretation of the requirements embodied in paragraph (1), a 
notable issue becomes prevalent. Which is that the scholars tend to phrase the requirements 
differently. This means that although their interpretation of the requirements are similar, the 
requirements themselves may not have been expressed identically. To illustrate this, I take the 
first part of paragraph (1); which states:  
 
‘A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was due to 
an impediment beyond his control…’ 
 
Accordingly Ronald Brand Believes that the first requirements is ‘…”due to an impediment 
beyond his control”.106 However Barry Nicholas believes that this sentence encompasses two 
requirements, which are: ‘(i) the non-performance must be “due to an impediment”; (ii) the 
impediment must have been “beyond his control”.107  Nevertheless my approach to resolve this 
is to find a middle ground between the various illustrations of the requirements. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
102 PECL, Art. 1:302. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Peter Schlechtriem ‘Uniform Sales Law - The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods’ available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem-79.html accessed on 2 July 2015. 
105 Secretariat Commentary ‘GUIDE TO CISG ARTICLE 79’ available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-79.html accessed on 24 June 2015. 
106 Ferrari, Fletcher and Brand op cit (n70) 393. 
107 Barry Nicholas ‘Impracticability and impossibility in the U.N. Convention on contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods’ available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas1.html#504 accessed on 1 July 2015. 
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I therefore believe that the requirements can be illustrated as follows: a party may succeed with 
an exception as to his non-performance, if he can prove that the non-performance (i) ‘was due 
to an impediment’108, said impediment was (ii) ‘beyond his control’109, of which at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract he (iii) ‘could not reasonably be expected to have taken the 
impediment into account’110, or he could not have also been expected to have  (iv) ‘avoided or 
overcome it or its consequences’111 and finally, according to Peter Schlechtriem, there must be 
a causal nexus between the impediment and the failed performance as illustrated in the text by 
the phrase ‘due to’.112 
 
(i) ‘was due to an impediment’ 
 
The first requirement indicates that there must be an “impediment”. It has to be however noted 
that CISG doesn’t contain a definitions clause; as a result it has been mentioned by Joseph 
Lookofsky, that according to the silence as to the definition within the CISG and for the fact 
that its ‘legislative history casts little clear light on its intended meaning’113, we are essentially 
left boggled as to what may constitute an impediment. 
 
To the issue of the vagueness of the intended meaning of the CISG, I therefore refer back to the 
drafting history as illustrated in the first chapter114, in summary however, a notable progression 
from the words “obstacle” to “circumstance” and finally settling on “impediment” could be 
observed.  
 
‘Professor Honnold stated that UNCITRAL’s use of the word “impediment” …[under Article 79]…was 
intended to revert back to words [similar to “obstacle”]  that implied an external, objective barrier to 
performance’.115  
 
Furthermore the Working group imported the term “impediment” from Alternative B into 
Alternative A. Martin Davies states that, it would appear that the use of the word “impediment” 
must not have seemed controversial at the time, to this he theories that the inclusion of the term 
was in fact to agree on a word not commonly used in either respective Common or Civil law 
                                                 
108 Barry Nicholas ‘Impracticability and impossibility in the U.N. Convention on contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods’ available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas1.html#504 accessed on 1 July 2015. 
And Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 608. 
109 Ibid.  
110 Ferrari, Fletcher and Brand op cit (n70) 393. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 608. 
113 Lookofsky op cit (n9) 188. 
114 See Chapter 1 at 1.2.2  
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jurisdictions, in a hope to create a new binding jurisprudence that would grow to become a new 
excuse principle.116   
 
Furthermore, the use of the words “due to” and “impediment” have been criticised for 
essentially existing as “elastic words”.117  The criticism exists based on consequences that it 
produces. It has been stated by Barry Nicholas that under an international enactment such 
words are undesirable, however in the context of a national enactment such words would most 
certainly be drafted against the backdrop of one legal system, essentially entailing that the 
drafters would be able to predict how such a word would play itself out with regard to its 
interpretation.118 The issue, in the context of an international instrument, is that there might not 
be a back drop or conversely that there might be a multiplicity of back drops, nevertheless the 
consequence of this would be that the interpretative body might import an interpretation 
common to their domestic legal system instead.119 This issue is commonly known as the 
homeward trend.120 
 
Despite the above, the issue still remains, as to what would constitutes an impediment? To this 
authors have taken various approaches from the ordinary meaning of the word to what 
impediments have courts and arbitral tribunals exempted. 
 
Joseph Lookofsky states that the ordinary meaning of the word is likened to that of an 
“obstacle” which is something that ‘gets in the way’.121 According to Black’s law dictionary, 
an “impediment” is defined as ‘a hindrance or obstruction’.122 Furthermore the Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary defines an “obstacle” as ‘a thing that blocks one’s way or hinders 
                                                                                                                                                           
115 Larry A. DiMattio (ed) International sales law: A Global Challenge (2014) 297. 
116 DiMattio op cit (n115) 298. 
117 Barry Nicholas ‘Impracticability and impossibility in the U.N. Convention on contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods’ available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas1.html#504 accessed on 1 July 2015. 
118 Ibid.  
119 Ibid. 
120Franco Ferrari ‘Homeward Trend and Lex Forism Despite Uniform Sales Law’ available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ferrari17.html accessed on 3 July 2015 
 ‘Threat to the CISG's main purpose be defined? According to those CISG commentators who have not only 
referred to the homeward trend, but who have also attempted to define it, the homeward trend is akin to the 
'natural' 'tendency of those interpreting the CISG to project the domestic law in which the interpreter was trained 
(and with which he or she is likely most familiar) onto the international provisions of the Convention'. It is, in 
other words, the 'the tendency to think that the words we see [in the text of the CISG] are merely trying, in their 
awkward way, to state the domestic rule we know so well’. 
121 Lookofsky op cit (n9) 188. 
122 Bryan A. Garner (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary 9ed (2009) 711. 
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progress’123. As illustrated, both definitions allude themselves to the notion of hindrance. 
Therefore, logically speaking an impediment must be something that hinders progress. 
 
Furthermore it has to be understood that, frequently courts and arbitral tribunal tend to hedge 
around the fact that there was an impediment.124 This means that the existence of an 
impediment when analysing case law should inevitable be gleaned from the fact that the 
exemption had been granted125 or alternatively that they have denied the exemption based the 
non-fulfilment of one of the other requirements necessary to satisfy Article 79. 126 Nevertheless 
the wide range of successful exemptions can in effect lead the reader to the notion that under 
those specific circumstances, an impediment of that kind would exist.127 Brandon Nagy further 
notes that an analysis of the current jurisprudence show that courts and arbitral tribunals 
essentially use the interpretation ‘that an impediment [is] an unmanageable risk or a totally 
exceptional event, such as force majeure, economic impossibility, or excessive onerousness’.128 
 
It is my view, based on what has been discussed above; that the definition of impediment is 
quite broad. An analysis of any of the considerations presented would eventually lead the 
reader to the existence of an impediment. Additionally, however the impediment must be 
premised on an ‘Objective circumstance’129 which has an effect on the defaulting party’s 
performance.130 
 
(ii) ‘beyond his control’ 
 
The existence of an impediment, however, is not enough to satisfy Article 79. Consequently the 
“impediment” must be ‘beyond [the defaulting parties] control’. To this requirement Peter 
Schlechtriem adds that the wording of Article 79 makes the assumption that the promisor has a 
notable “sphere of control”.131 It must be understood that when this requirement is discussed 
and debated, the scholars do nothing more that illustrate with regard to case law, that this 
requirement either had or had not been met.  
                                                 
123 Judy Pearsall (ed) Concise Oxford English Dictionary 10ed (2002) 983. 
124 Brandon Nagy ‘Unreliable Excuses: How do Differing Persuasive Interpretations of CISG Article 79 Affect its 
Goal of Harmony?’ (2013) 21. 
125 Ibid.  
126 Ibid.  
127 See introduction in Chapter 1 at 1.1.  
128 Nagy op cit (n124) 22. 
129 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 608. ‘These objective circumstances may be natural, social, or political events, or 
physical or legal difficulties, such as a ban on exports or imports.’ 
130 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 608. 
131 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 610. 
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An example of which can be illustrated by Joseph Lookofsky in his work titled CONVENTION 
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, in which he states that, 
 
‘The German Supreme court took pains to emphasize in its landmark 1999 decision, that a party can never be 
granted an Article 79 exemption unless he proves that the impediment in question lies “beyond is control”, and 
because the possibility of assuring that the goods in question do conform will nearly always lie within the seller’s 
sphere of control, the beyond-control requirement itself severely reduces the possibility of exempting a given 
seller from liability for non-conformity’.132 
 
In this case however the defaulting party did not succeed. This case will be discussed in greater 
detail further on.133 
 
Furthermore Peter Schlechtriem adds that the concept of “sphere of control” denotes a sphere 
within which it is objectively possible and can be expected of the promisor to adopt measures 
that are necessary for his due performance under the contract.134 Therefore he consequently 
states that any matters which fall outside this sphere would impair the adoption of the 
necessary measures or performance, examples being: floods, earthquakes, prevented delivery 
due to war or riot, etc.135 
 
(iii) ‘could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account’ 
 
The third requirement is qualified by the phrase ‘at the time of the conclusion of the contract’, 
it is my interpretation that the parties should not have foreseen the likely occurrence of the 
impediment when the contract was being concluded.  
 
Furthermore, the definition of reasonableness has been discussed.136 To this I add that the 
definition of reasonableness within the CISG has universal application, therefore it holds the 
same meaning within paragraphs (1) and (4).137  
 
                                                 
132 Lookofsky op cit (n9) 188. 
133 See Chapter 3 at 3.4. 
134 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 610. 
135 Ibid.  
136 See Chapter 2 at 2.1. 
137 http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text-79.html accessed on 2 July 2015 at ‘definition of reasonableness’. 
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This requirements of “taken…into account”, has been termed the foreseeability requirement,138 
however the language of the provision does not expressly state or make reference to the use of 
the word foreseeability, instead taken into account is used. Nevertheless, according to the Pace 
law website it has been recognised that ‘An Article 79 issue present is whether it was 
reasonable for the non-performing party to foresee or take an impediment into account’.139 The 
use of the word “or” in the sentence would lead one to believe that these two terms are 
interchangeable. 
 
Additionally, Larry DiMatteo states that ‘the ultimate question under Article 79 should not be 
whether the impediment was foreseeable, but whether it was one that a reasonable person 
would have taken into account when making the contract’.140  I have to agree with this 
interpretation, as it reads more in line with the phrasing and spirit of Article 79. Furthermore 
his reasoning, is due to the fact that there is a difference between foreseeing a possibility and 
taking it into account.141 Hence he argues that ‘taking into account involves considering what 
might be done to guard against the foreseen possibility and then deciding whether or not to take 
that action’.142  He further advocates that the inclusion of a force majeure clause would 
illustrate that an event has been taken into account.143  
 
‘…In essence, what the structure of Article 79 calls for, [is] a consideration of whether the party seeking 
relief might have “provided against” the relevant changed circumstances “by [its] contract” ’.144  
 
Despite this there may however be situations so unusual, that it could not have been taken into 
account and consequently, not contemplated.145 Note, however, that it is commonly understood 
that in today’s age, despite the occurrence of these events, there are hardly any circumstances 
that are unforeseeable to some degree; this makes this requirement particularly difficult to 
satisfy.146 In such situations however, Peter Schlechtriem provides the solution, that we should 
take a purely subjective approach to this issue.147 The subjective approach will be in light of the 
promisor and the contract, meaning that ‘whether the actual circumstances at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract the promisor ought to have reasonably foreseen the impediment to 
                                                 
138 Lookofsky op cit (n9) 188. 
139 http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text-79.html accessed on 2 July 2015 at ‘definition of foreseeability’. 
140 DiMattio op cit (n115) 302. 
141 DiMattio op cit (n115) 302. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid.  
144 DiMattio op cit (n115) 303. 
145 DiMattio op cit (n115) 304. 
146 Lookofsky op cit (n9) 189. And Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 611. 
147 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 611. 
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some degree likely to occur’.148 This would indicate that total foreseeability is not important. 
what is important however based on the argument of Larry DiMatteo is whether there is 
evidence to suggest that the matter had been taken into account based on the contract and 
whether the promisor had decided to take action against the impediment or not. This “taking 
action” is expressed as the next requirement. 
  
(iv) ‘avoided or overcome it or its consequences’ 
 
Often requirement (iii) and (iv) are coupled together. Accordingly, in the context of 
requirement (iii), the promisor should have taken the necessary steps to ‘avoided or overcome 
it or its consequences’149 the impediment, which had been taken into account. It is not enough 
that he had taken the impediment into account, he should avoid the impediment in a reasonable 
manner.150  
 
However as illustrated by Joseph Lookofsky, with regard to the example of generically defined 
obligations such as the delivery of coal or wood, which is not restricted under the contract to a 
particular supplier.151 If the sellers own supply dried up this would not permit him to be 
exempted, meaning that this requirement is equally difficult to satisfy and could serve as a 
barrier against exemption in this context.152 Furthermore, 
 
‘“Avoidability”, in the context of Article 79, means the faculty of avoiding an actual disturbance which is 
caused by a specific impediment’.153  
 
Based on the above statement by Peter Schlechtriem, I have been led to believe that the 
requirement of avoidability must be read with regard to the particular impediment that is 
present, making this requirement completely subjective, when under analysis. 
 
(v) ‘due to’: Causal nexus between the impediment and the Non-performance 
 
The causal nexus is not obviously expressed within the Article, it exists. With regard to Article 
79, the causal nexus is implied by the use of the words “due to”154. Therefore, read within the 
                                                 
148 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 611. 
149 CISG, Art. 79(1). 
150 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 611. 
151 Lookofsky op cit (n9) 191. 
152 Ibid.  
153 Schlechtriem op cit (n35) 612. 
154 CISG, ART. 79(1). 
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context of Article 79(1) there has to be a causal nexus between the impediment and the non-
performance, effectively meaning that the non-performance must be ‘due to’ an impediment. 
This requirement is not complex and as a result will be briefly discussed. 
 
Denis Tallon notes that the inclusion of the causality requirement is a logical one.155 This 
means that ‘the seller cannot avail himself of an event’.156 He rationalises this by way of 
example, in which a seller refuses to perform a contract and subsequently his warehouse, in 
which the goods were housed, burns down.157 In this case his non-performance was due to the 
fact that he refused to perform, not due to the fact that the goods had been lost.158 However he 
adds that when there are several causes, the determination of this requirement becomes 
problematic.159 His solution is that, this decision lies in the hands subjective appraisal of the 
judge in which he may follow two paths, the first is that Article 80160 may influence the matter 
or secondly the judge may resolve the issue based on the approach within his domestic law.161  
Nevertheless the causality requirement can only be satisfied with regard to the exclusive 
cause.162 
 
To conclude based on all the requirement, John Honnold once stated that ‘one [can easily] 
notice that the scope of Article 79 is broad’163.What can be determined based on the above 
interpretation of the requirements, is that reducing them to their exact meaning, which can be 
followed by courts is extremely difficult. Upon the completion of identifying these 
requirements it is my opinion that the interpretation and application of Article 79 is entirely 
dependent on the facts of a particular case. However the use of elastic words like “impediment” 
essentially mean that for us to truly get a concrete interpretation of each requirement, we would 
have to move through every situation that essentially could exist as an impediment. Applying 
such a strategy to determine the exact meaning of the requirements contained within Article 79 
is utterly unrealistic.  
 
                                                 
155 Denis Tallon, in Bianca-Bonell ‘Commentary on the International Sales Law’ (1987) 582 available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tallon-bb79.html accessed on 3 August 2015’ at 2.6.6. 
156 Ibid.  
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid.  
160 CISG, Art. 80 reads as follows: ‘A party may not rely on a failure of the other party to perform, to the extent 
that such failure was caused by the first party's act or omission’.  
161 Denis Tallon, in Bianca-Bonell ‘Commentary on the International Sales Law’ (1987) 582 available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tallon-bb79.html accessed on 3 August 2015 at 2.6.6. 
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2.3 The Relationship between Article 6 and Article 79 
The principle of party autonomy is of primary importance within international trade law, it 
premises itself on the concept that the parties to a contract are free to determine the rules with 
due regard given to the terms of their contract.164Article 6 of the CISG essentially exists to 
preserve this concept and as a result has been deemed the “opt-out” provision of the CISG.165 
Practically, Article 6 of the CISG, effectively grants upon the parties the right to deviate from 
any provision of the CISG, it reads as follows: 
 
‘The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or 
vary the effect of any of its provisions’.166  
 
It is therefore, my view that Article 6 effectively expresses a respect for the autonomy of the 
parties with regard to their contract. 
 
To place the relationship between Article 6 and Article 79 in context, I draw the reader’s 
attention to the Corn case167. This case was heard before the International Commercial 
Arbitration at the Ukraine Chamber of Commerce and Trade. It involves a Ukrainian seller and 
a Swiss buyer. The facts are as follows, on the 26 July 2011 the Swiss buyer commenced 
arbitration against the Ukrainian buyer based on breach of contract. The breach revolved 
around the fact that in terms of the contract the seller had the obligation to deliver corn in five 
shipments, of which he supplied the first shipment then subsequently failed to deliver the rest 
due a change in Ukrainian law. This change made it impossible for the seller to obtain the 
requisite license in order to export the corn.    
 
Of importance is the way in which the arbitral tribunal discussed and considered Article 6 read 
together with Article 79. To this they stated that Article 79 resembles a force majeure clause 
and further noted that upon inspection of the contract, there were other provisions that seemed 
to be expressed as a force majeure clause however they seemed to cater for more, than Article 
79 did.  
                                                                                                                                                           
163 John O. Honnold Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention 3ed (1999) 
473. 
164 Franco Ferrari (ed) ‘The 1980 Uniform Sales Law: Old issues revisited in the light of Recent Experienced’ 
(2003) 5. 
165 Ibid.  
166 CISG, Art. 6. 
167  (Corn Case)- International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry [218y/2011] 23 January 2012 available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/120123u5.html accessed on 
20 July 2015. 
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‘Therefore, applying Article 6 CISG allowing derogation or variance from the CISG, the tribunal noted 
that the provisions of the contract should prevail over Article 79(1)’.168  
 
The tribunal found that after examining the contract, that the failure to supply the rest of the 
shipment was due to a force majeure that could be excused either under Article 79 or the force 
majeure clause. 
 
This case illustrates that according to Article 6 of the CISG, if a contract provides a force 
majeure clause, which embodies more than that of Article 79, then the force majeure clause 
must be considered instead of Article 79 due to the application of Article 6. This demonstrates 
what I had said about the relationship between Article 6 and party autonomy. 
 
Furthermore Ronald Brand reiterates the positions of John Honnold, who believes that the 
delivery of non-conforming goods cannot be exempt under Article 79 and Peter Schlechtriem 
who argues that it can.169 Brand therefore begs the question, what would be the situation if the 
parties had included their own force majeure clause?  
 
To this he states that if John Honnold was correct, then Article 79 would not excuse the 
delivery of defective goods, however the use of a force majeure clause contained within the 
contract, and which excuse the seller’s delivering of defective goods, according to Article 6 
would not only allow it, but would be the only permissible way to cater for this issue.170 Brand 
then notes that if Peter Schlechtriem’s argument was correct, then the inclusion of such a force 
majeure clause would not be necessary.171  
 
To this however I have to draw the reader’s attention, once more to the Corn case, in which it 
was stated, that with regard to the application of Article 6, any deviation from the provisions of 
the CISG that caters for more than that which is catered for in Article 79 would mean that the 
force majeure clause would be preferred. Essentially this would mean that, it is in the interest 
of the parties to provide for a force majeure clause that excuses the delivery of non-conformity 
of goods. This is based on the fact that as illustrated above, the requirements of Article 79 are 
very vague and more often than not, as will be discussed through case law analysis, are very 
                                                 
168 Corn Case supra (n167). 
169 Ferrari, Fletcher and Brand op cit (n70) 401. Also see Chapter 3 at 3.2 and 3.3 for a detailed discussion of their 
arguments. 
170 Ferrari, Fletcher and Brand op cit (n70) 401. 
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difficult to satisfy. Essentially what I would like to illustrate based on Article 6 is that parties to 
a contract can exempt the delivery of defective goods by including it into a contract under a 
force majeure clause, despite the fact that it is still left open to interpretation as to whether it 
can be excused under Article 79. Furthermore the ‘inclusion of a force majeure clause is a 
simple and cost-free precaution that is unlikely to affect the bargained-for price because it may 
operate for the benefit of either of the parties, depending on what happens’.172  
 
CHAPTER 3: THE DEBATE OF NON- CONFORMITY 
AS A VIABLE EXCUSE UNDER ARTICLE 79 
3.1 The Advisory Council 
In June 2001, at a meeting in Paris, the foremost experts on the CISG gathered to discuss the 
creation of a council tasked with the responsibility of interpreting the CISG.173 This established 
council would come to be known as the Advisory Council of the United Nations Conventions 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (hereafter “CISG-AC”). The existence and 
creation of this council was to address the ambiguity and vagueness that has always plagued 
the CISG and which merited an interpretive guidance.174 Consequently their primary goal is to 
guide courts and tribunals to a uniform interpretation of the CISG.175  
 
In practice however the responsibility of the CISG is to draft opinion concerning the 
interpretation of the CISG, note that while drafting these opinions the council is guided by 
Article 7.176 To date the CISG-AC consists of sixteen members177 and has published sixteen 
opinions178 and two declarations179. The most important for our purposes is Opinion 7180; 
however a detailed discussion of this opinion is not important as the dissertation reflects their 
discussion. Furthermore, what must be underscored is the fact that, despite the CISG-AC 
                                                 
172 DiMattio op cit (n115) 302. 
173 Mistelis op cit (n1) 1. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Joshua D. H. Karton ‘Can the CISG Advisory Council Affect the Homeward Trend?’ (2009) 457. 
176 See Chapter 4 at 4.1.1 for full text of Article 7 and Mistelis op cit (n1) 2. 
177 See the list of the current Advisory council member at ‘council members’ available at 
http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?ipkCat=129&sid=129 accessed on 9 July 2015.   
178 See the full list of Advisory council opinions at ‘Opinions’ available at 
http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?ipkCat=128&sid=128 accessed on 9 July 2015.  
179 See full list of declarations at ‘Declarations’ available at 
http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?ipkCat=128&sid=128 accessed on 9 July 2015. 
180 ‘Opinion 7’ available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op7.html accessed on 29 August 2015. 
‘Opinion 7 is titled: Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG’. 
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members publishing opinions under the council, its members also publishes opinions 
independently, known as commentaries181 which will become important later.   
 
Additionally, drawing from the way in which I have illustrated the advisory council, it may 
appear that the CISG-AC would be an official body tasked to interpret the Convention, this is 
however not the case. ‘Indeed, while it emphasizes that it is a private initiative, the Advisory 
Council has taken on something of an official appearance’.182 Joshua Karton, makes the 
statement that although they are not an official body they however do function much like 
one.183 He bases this on two points: first, that they have drafted a charter184 illustrating their 
‘…mission, procedures, membership, sponsors, and the roles of the chair and secretary’185 and 
second that their ‘opinions…read more like official commentaries than scholarly 
publications’186.  
 
Of interest, Loukas Mistelis believes that ‘they are scholars who look beyond the cooking pot 
for ideas and for a more profound understanding of issues relating to CISG’.187 
 
3.2 Argument against non-conformity existing as an excuse: 
John O. Honnold’s take on the issue 
The most prominent scholar, who has frequently been cited by numerous academics, scholars, 
courts and frequently by the CISG-AC in their opinions, is Professor John Honnold. 188  All 
scholars that believe that the delivery on non-conforming goods cannot be excused for the 
purposes of Article 79, subscribe to Honnold’s argument. Therefore an analysis of his 
argument is important. However to the critical conclusion of the findings of this dissertation, it 
                                                 
181 Examples of these would be the ‘commentary on the UN convention on the international sale of goods’, second 
edition by Peter schlechtriem (ED) and the ‘UN Convention on contracts for the international sale of goods 
(CISG)’ by Stefan kröll, Loukas Mistelis and Pilar Perales Viscasillas.  
182 Karton op cit (n175) 454. 
183 Ibid.  
184 Ibid. ‘note that the charter remains a draft which had never adopted; it is considered to be more of a 
gentleman’s agreement, which is not formally binding’. 
185 Karton op cit (n175) 454. 
186 Ibid.  
187 Mistelis op cit (n1) 2. 
188 ‘Emeritus Professor John Honnold, Father of the Vienna Convention, Dies at 95’ available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/1901-emeritus-professor-john-honnold-father-of-the#.Vbi_z_mqqko 
accessed on 29 July 2015. ‘Honnold returned to Penn Law in 1974 but continued working on and advocating 
acceptance of the UNCITRAL draft. In 1980, the draft was adopted at the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods in Vienna, Austria. For his work leading up to the adoption, Honnold became known 
as the “father of the Vienna Convention.” furthermore he has been coined the father of the CISG for his notable 
contributions to the interpretation thereof ’. 
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is not the argument itself that is important but the sources that he cites in order to establish his 
argument. 
 
Honnold’s basis for qualifying that Article 79 does not allow for non-conforming of goods to 
exist as an impediment, finds its roots in the travaux preparatoires which in English is known 
as the “preparatory works or drafting history” of the CISG.189 The drafting history of the CISG 
had already been discussed190, however for the purposes of completeness, it will briefly be 
revisited. 
 
Honnold states that the issue at hand had been thoroughly discussed during the preparation of 
the ULIS191. Notably in the course of the Hague Conference in 1964, controversy had struck 
over the use of the word “obstacle’ as opposed to “Circumstance”.192 This was due to the fact 
that the word considered for adoption under the draft was “obstacle”.193 It was at this time that 
a Civil law group had argued that: 
 
‘This test [obstacle] might refer only to supervening and external events, as contrasted with the more 
personal issue as to the seller’s due care or fault, and might bar excuse based on an extreme and onerous 
change in economic circumstances’.194  
 
Consequently, the word “obstacle” was later replaced by the word “circumstance”, which is 
evident based on the wording of Article 74 of the ULIS. This change in wording meant that, 
with regard to the interpretation of the provision, a ‘drastic change in costs or other economic 
conditions’195 could now be considered. Note that according to André Tunc, in his commentary 
on the International Sale of Goods and the Formation of the Contract of Sale, he had made the 
statement that according to Article 74: 
 
‘Exemption from liability will be effective even in the case of the handing over of goods which do not 
conform to the contract, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, and this is why the text refers to 
                                                 
189 John O Honnold Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention 3ed (1999) 
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/honnold.html accessed on 29 July 2015 and ‘What are 
travaux préparatoires and how can I find them?’ Available at http://ask.un.org/faq/14541 accessed on the 29 July 
2015. 
190 See Chapter 1 at 1.2.2. 
191 John O Honnold Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention 3ed (1999) 
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/honnold.html accessed on 29 July 2015.  
192 Ibid.  
193 Ibid.  
194 Ibid. 
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"circumstances" which gave rise to non-performance, a term more vague and general than the term 
"obstacle" which was used in Article 85 of the Draft’.196 
 
However, after the creation of UNCITRAL, the term “circumstance” was replaced by the word 
“impediment”, the word “impediment” is perceived to hold characteristics similar to that of 
“obstacle”.197 Hence, we see a shift from a word that once allowed for the inclusion of 
circumstances personal to the seller’s performance, shift back to one that does not.198 
 
What’s more, Honnold argues that the notion that the word impediment considers situations 
where performance is prevented is supported by Article 79(4)199. To this he states that the 
inclusion of this paragraph would be absurd with regard to hidden defects, and furthermore this 
provision was not included within Article 74 of the ULIS.200   
 
For the purposes of this discussion, the most important point that he makes with regard to the 
fact that non-conformity does not exist as an excuse, is based on discussions and a decision 
taken at the diplomatic conference.201 What has to be underscored, based on the above 
argument is that, Honnold, has essentially derived his conclusion using the drafting history of 
the CISG, which means that his argument is premised on legislative intent of the drafters. To 
this the CISG-AC explains in Opinion 7 that,  
 
‘At that time, some delegates from common-law jurisdictions favoring a "warranty-based" liability in 
contract law raised concerns that the prevailing view in civil law jurisdictions, to the effect that 
contractual liability is based on proof of fault, might unduly influence civil-law judges or arbitrators too 
                                                 
196 Mr. André Tunc ‘Commentary on the Hague Conventions of the 1st of July 1964 on International Sale of Goods 
and the Formation of the Contract of Sale’ available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tunc.html 
accessed on 29 July 2015. 
197 John O Honnold Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention 3ed (1999) 
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198 Ibid. 
199 CISG, Art. 79(4) ‘the party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the impediment and its 
effect on his ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other party within a reasonable time after the 
party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the impediment, he is liable for damages resulting 
from such non-receipt’. 
200 John O Honnold Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention 3ed (1999) 
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/honnold.html accessed on 29 July 2015 at §426(1)(a). 
201 Ibid. see footnote 10 in the book which states ‘The basic change narrowing the area of exemption provided by 
ULIS 74 was taken in UNCITRAL: The Working Group: (1974) V YB 39–40, 58, Docy. Hist. 185–186 204; 
(1975) VI YB 60–61, Docy. Hist. 251–252; The Commission: VIIIYB 56–57, Docy. Hist. 349–350; Diplomatic 
Conference: O.R. 80, 55–56, 378–386, 408–412, 430, 134–136, 227, Docy. Hist. 401, 445–446, 599–607, 629–
633, 651, 705–708, 762 (adoption by Plenary 42–0). An authoritative analysis of the decision to deny exemption 
with respect to defects in goods by Professor Nicholas, chairman of the Drafting Party on exemption, appears 
in Parker Colloq. Ch. 5 at §5.02[21, pp. 5–10—5–14. Accord: Tallon, B-B Commentary at 580, Honnold’s 
explanation at the Vienna Conference, O.R. 410–411, Docy. Hist. 631–632. But cf. Schlechtriem 1986 
Commentary 101 n. 416a’. 
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ready to allow sellers to escape liability for defective performance, pleading events beyond their control 
that could not have been taken into account’.202 
 
This provides a very solid argument as the source cited is premise on legislative intent. 
However Honnold makes an additional statement of vital importance, which is that ‘Under the 
Convention the answer [to the issue at hand] is not obvious, since exemption may apply to a 
party’s failure to perform [any] of its [obligations].’203  
 
This notion as to the wording of the convention has been cited by Harry Flechtner as being one 
of the criticisms to Professor Honnold’s Argument. To this he states that:  
 
‘Although Professor Honnold's position that Article 79 was not intended to apply to a seller's delivery of 
non-conforming goods has substantial support in the drafting history of the provision as well as the 
principles underlying the CISG, the language of Article 79 does not unambiguously state that its scope is 
so limited’.204 
 
It is with this in mind that we move forward to discuss the argument that the delivery of non-
conforming goods is excusable under Article 79. 
 
3.3 Argument for non-conformity as an excuse: Peter 
Schlechtriem’s take on the issue 
Professor Peter Schlechtriem is one of the most prominent CISG-AC Members.205 When one 
argues that non-conformity exists as an exemption for the purposes of Article 79, 
Schlechtriem’s argument is almost always stated as the authority.206  As a result, a discussion 
of his argument is important. 
 
Peter Schlechtriem states that, with regard to non-conformity of goods existing as an 
impediment, it is possible based on the principle that the seller has the obligation to deliver 
                                                 
202 CISG-AC Opinion No. 7 ‘Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG’ Available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op7.html. Accessed on 20 July 2015. 
203 John O Honnold Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention 3ed (1999) 
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impediment’. 
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conforming goods under Article 35 of the CISG.207 Additionally, even if the seller sells specific 
goods in his possession, an exemption is not prohibited even if the defect already existed at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract.208 
 
Furthermore he discusses the change of words as discussed by Honnold and reaches a 
conclusion that it would appear that the delivery of defective goods would not exist as 
exemption, to which he notes that this would be the view of English and American law and 
cannot be followed.209 Schlechtriem’s reasons based on the fact that, unlike English and 
American law, the CISG does not place upon the seller a special warranty to supply 
conforming goods in addition to his general obligation to supply delivered goods.210 
Subsequently he reaches the notion that the CISG instead imposes an obligation that the goods 
be free from defect instead.211 
 
I cannot however agree with this argument. In Chapter II of the CISG, clearly titled 
“Obligations of the Seller”, we find all the obligations that the seller holds with regard to the 
CISG. Within his obligations we furthermore find Article 35(1) which reads: 
 
‘(1) the seller [must] deliver goods which are of the quantity, [quality] and [description] [required by the 
contract]...’ 
 
This Article is not negatively worded so as to establish that the seller is obliged to deliver 
goods, which are subsequently free of defect. Instead it clearly states that the obligation that the 
seller holds with regard to conformity of goods is to provide the exact good expressly agreed 
upon under the contract. Therefore the seller must deliver conforming goods. Nevertheless if 
his interpretation of this Article was correct, the obligation to provide goods free from defect 
would inevitably mean that he must provide conforming goods, due to the words ‘deliver goods 
which are of the…[quality] and [description] [required by the contract]’212.  
 
According to Black’s Law dictionary, “conforming” is defined as follows: ‘Being in 
accordance with contractual obligations (conforming goods)’213. Article 35(1) seems to align 
itself with this definition of conforming in the sense that it illustrates compliance the 
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contractual obligations as expressed214. Therefore, Article 35(1) must be referring to 
conforming goods. 
 
Finally he reaches the conclusion that if there is a defect in the good then accordingly the 
seller’s performance is incomplete and resultantly, it is logical to ask whether the impediment 
to performance is impossible to overcome.215 Such an impediment therefore may lie at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract of which fact the seller is not aware.216 To this he states that 
the wording of Article 79 does not suggest such a restriction to what may constitute an 
impediment.217  
 
The CISG-AC in Opinion 7 has also stated that, 
 
‘A defect present in the goods at the time of the conclusion of the contract may conceivably constitute an 
impediment to the seller's obligation to deliver conforming goods under CISG Article 35. Indeed, to the 
extent that delivery of conforming goods is expressed as a contractual obligation under the CISG (rather 
than in terms of warranties or guarantees), it stands to reason that a breach of the obligation to deliver 
conforming goods amounts to a seller's failure to perform "any of his obligations"’.218  
 
For the purposes of this discussion, what is important as to Schlechtriem’s and the CISG-AC 
arguments is that, based on the wording of Article 79, the delivery of defective goods could 
exist as an impediment and consequently be exempted under Article 79 due to the fact that it 
can be perceived as a failure to perform ‘any of his obligations’219. At this point an interesting 
play between the, for and against arguments is observable. According to Honnold the answer to 
the issue is a definitive “no”, based on legislated intent as demonstrated within the drafting 
history, whereas according to Schlechtriem the answer is definitive “yes”, based on the 
wording of the provision. Logically this means that the wording of the Article 79 does not 
expresses the intention of the negotiating or drafting parties.  
 
As a result I have been led to believe that a definitive answer can be attained by funneling this 
provision through an interpretive guide, which would beg the question should we follow the 
drafting history? Or a purely textual approach? Or should we read the established legislative 
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218 CISG-AC Opinion No. 7 ‘Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG’ Available at 
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intent into the provision so as to restrict the obligations of the seller to any obligation except 
the impediment of delivering defective goods?   
 
3.4 Current state of affairs: an analysis of the available case law  
‘Most recently, UNCITRAL, the CISG formulating agency, has completed a digest which 
provides a comprehensive presentation of case law on the CISG and aims at assisting courts in 
the application of the Convention.’220 For this part of the dissertation the author will analyze 
the case law available, this analysis will be based on cases starting in 1998 till those most 
recent, with reference to the issue at hand. Note that because of the fact that the CISG is 
international legislation, most of the cases have been decided in the respective language of the 
court that has heard and decided upon the matter. In order to assist the international world, pace 
university makes the attempt to translate each case from its respective language to English221, 
however many cases remain untranslated. For this I will have to rely on English abstracts made 
available instead.  
 
The first time the issue of non-conformity of goods existing as an impediment for the purposes 
of Article 79 was encountered, was in 1998 in the Tribunal de commerce [District Court] de 
Besançon of France. This case is commonly known within the academic community as Flippe 
Christian v. Douet Sport Collections222. The facts of this case are quite simple, a Swiss buyer 
had contracted with as French seller for the sale of Judo-suits. The seller however had received 
complaints from his respective clients concerning a defect. This defect was that after the judo-
suits were washed, they would shrink. One of the complaining clients was the Swiss buyer, 
who had given notice of the defect, twice223 and had furthermore requested an amicable 
resolution of the dispute. Despite sending the notice twice, the buyer had not received any 
response from the seller, consequently the buyer had the goods examined by an expert who had 
identified the non-conformity. Thus, the buyer then relied on the remedy of avoidance of the 
contract, in which he had sought to claim the purchase price and damages. The court held that 
based on the expert evidence, a lack of conformity had been established, as a result the buyer 
was entitled to avoid the contract and be awarded damages although the amount of damages 
received would be subject to the fact that the buyer could not prove that all the goods received 
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were defective and had made a profit of the non-defective goods. However within the context 
of Article 79, the court held that the seller’s failure to perform was subject to the actions of a 
third party who had manufactured the goods, this was the identifiable impediment that existed. 
Consequently the court ordered a 35 per cent reduction of the purchase price and the seller to 
reimburse the buyer accordingly. This case demonstrates that Article 79 had been successfully 
satisfied at least once. 
 
Within the same year, we find, a decision handed down by a German court (Oberlandsgericht 
Zweibrücken) that concerned a similar type situation in which the court had found that Article 
79 could not be relied upon. This case is known as the Vine Wax case224. A German seller had 
sold vine wax to an Austrian buyer. Vine wax is a product ‘which protects the rootstocks and 
the cuttings [of grape vine] against dehydration and infections’225. The defect within this case 
was that after the buyer had used the vine wax to treat his plants, some of the plants had been 
damaged. The buyer therefore claimed non-conformity and sought damages. The seller on the 
other hand asserted the fact that he merely acted as an intermediary and had received the 
product from his supplier. Consequently the defectiveness of the goods was due to his supplier 
of which it can be considered to be an impediment beyond his control. The court however 
found that goods did not meet the demands of practice and as a result they were not in 
conformity for the purposes of Article 35(1) of the CISG.  
 
However what is important for our purposes is the way in which the German court approached 
Article 79.  To this the court stated that the delivery of non-conforming goods, can exist as an 
impediment for the purposes of Article 79, however the requirements of Article 79 still has to 
be satisfied226. With this consideration the court held that the ‘beyond his control’ requirement 
had not been satisfied by the seller, reasoning that, it was not reasonable for the seller to rely on 
the product of his supplier without undertaking large-scale field trials. This would have been 
considered necessary because vine wax was a newly developed product. Therefore the 
impediment was not beyond the seller’s sphere of control. Furthermore despite the fact that the 
seller had acted as an intermediary he was nevertheless responsible for lack of conformity and 
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31 March 1998 [8 O 1995/95] Available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980331g1.html. Accessed on 20 July 
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within such circumstances the supplier of an intermediary cannot be regarded as a third party 
for the purposes of Article 79(2).  
 
This case demonstrates that interpretation of the CISG left up to the domestic courts could 
produce a growth within the interpretation of the CISG however it may also create the situation 
where two divergent opinions as to the wording of the CISG may arise. Also we can see that 
despite the fact that the seller had failed to be exempted under Article 79, that the courts seem 
to have agreed up to that point that non-conformity of goods exists as an excusable 
impediment. 
 
The German seller was not happy with the decision of the Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken and 
sought an appeal in the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court) in 1999.227 It was noted in 
the Bundesgerichtshof that the court a quo (Appeal Court) had established the liability of the 
seller without deciding if whether Article 79 was applicable. The reasoning of the court a quo 
was that even if applicable, the seller would not satisfy Article 79’s ‘beyond his control’ 
requirement. The Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken further held that, even though it was not the 
case, that under Article 79, the seller will only be excused from liability of the impediment is 
beyond the control of that seller and his respective suppliers. As a result the court hedged 
around the determination if Article 79 can be relied on with regard to all kinds of non-
performance, which would include delivery of defective goods. Furthermore it stated that with 
regard to the liability of the seller due to his failure to provide conforming goods, it inevitably 
made no difference whether the seller or the supplier was at fault, as a result ‘Article 79 does 
not alter the allocation of risk’228. The Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken therefore decided that 
the judgement in favour of the buyer, should be set aside and remanded back to the appeal 
court. Its reasoning was based on the fact that, the seller had made no effort to mitigate his loss. 
The Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken inevitably decided the matter on the basis of German law 
as opposed to Article 7 of the CISG for the fact that the matter before it was procedural rather 
than substantive. 
 
In the Bundesgerichtshof of Germany in 2002, the issue appears again.229 This case is known as 
the Powdered Milk case and revolves around a German seller who had entered into several 
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contracts of sale of powdered milk with a Dutch buyer. The Dutch buyer had then resold the 
powdered milk to an Algerian company and a Dutch company. Before selling it, an inspection 
was held that yielded no negative results, it was subsequently shipped off to the respective 
companies. However after processing in Algeria it became evident that the product had a rancid 
taste. Note that the Dutch company had also identified this problem. The buyer as a result 
commenced with an action against the seller claiming that, the goods did not conform at the 
time of the passing of the risk; however the defect only became apparent upon the processing 
of the product. The issue had then passed through the German court system starting with the 
court of first instance which dismissed the buyer’s claim.230 The court of appeal 
(Oberlandesgericht Dresden) ‘partially granted the claim, compelling the seller to pay damages 
according to Articles 74 and 75 CISG’.231  
 
However, of importance was the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court), 
in which it was stated that the seller did not satisfy the requirements of Article 79, because the 
seller could not show that the defect was beyond his sphere of control and that he had taken 
steps to avoid the defect. 
 
 Importantly, the court noted that, 
 
‘It may remain open whether this rule can generally be applied to goods that do not meet contractual 
requirements’.232  
 
The court makes very important obiter dicta however: in the event of further proceedings, it 
states that in its opinion Article 79 does apply to goods that do not conform to the requirements 
of the contract. Considering this, the court notes that the seller could only succeed under 
Article 79 if he could prove the argument that it made. The argument was that, 
  
‘The powdered milk had been manufactured according to the current knowledge of science and 
technology and that any existing lipase stock [which was the organism that caused the defect] could have 
only been such stock that could have never been excluded based on standard procedure’.233 
 
In 2003, the issue was considered once more, this time by the Tribunale d’appello in Lugano, 
Switzerland (Appellate Court). This case is known as the Modular Wall Partitions case.234 This 
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case had a Swiss buyer and an Italian supplier (seller) and concerned the sale of modular wall 
partitions. Note that the case was on appeal because the seller had successfully sued the buyer 
for the outstanding balance on the sale price. However, what has to be underscored with regard 
to this case is that the defect did not concern the quality of the wall partitions but revolved 
around the way in which they were installed.  
 
It is therefore important to understand that this case dealt with Article 79(2), which meant that 
the seller would have only been excused in a situation where the person responsible for 
installation was acting based upon his request. Furthermore the court held that employees and 
suppliers are not considered to be third parties for the purposes of the CISG, even though they 
are ‘subjects who, autonomously or as independent parties, fulfill a part or the whole of the 
contract’235. The court therefore established certain criteria to determine a third party, namely: 
1) individuals, charged by the seller, 2) after the conclusion of the contract, 3) with the 
fulfillment of existing obligations to the buyer. Furthermore the court noted the examples of a 
carrier, tasked with delivery under the contract and subcontractors assigned by the seller to 
carry out the finished work, as examples of a third parties. As a result the court considered the 
issue to be whether they had received the task directly from the buyer or the seller.236 From the 
record of witnesses the court concluded that the persons responsible for instillation were at the 
behest of the seller. The court held that with regard to this particular situation, the buyer would 
bear the burden of proof to establish this and because he didn’t satisfy this burden of proof the 
court ordered the buyer to pay the outstanding sales price, consequently it upheld the decision 
of the court a quo. 
 
The next importance case was decided in 2004, in the Oberster Gerichtshof (Federal Supreme 
Court of Austria) and is titled the Omnibus case. 237 In this case we have an Austrian seller and 
a Swiss buyer, though the plaintiff in this case is the insurer of the buyer. The seller is a 
distributor of omnibuses produced by a German supplier (intervening party 1). Note that there 
is a second supplier (intervening party 2). The second intervening party is the supplier of the air 
conditioning units installed in the Omnibuses. The facts of this case is simply that the buyer 
had ordered two omnibuses. Based on internal corporate guidelines the seller was only 
                                                                                                                                                           
29 October 2003 [12.2002.181] available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031029s1.html accessed on 20 July 
2015. 
235 Ibid.  
236 Ibid.  
237 (Omnibus case)- Federal Supreme Court of Austria (Oberster Gerichtshof) 
21 April 2004 [7 Ob 32/04p] available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040421a3.html accessed on 20 July 
2015. 
P a g e  | 36 
 
authorized to sell the omnibuses within Austria and not to foreign buyers at the time. 
Consequently the buyer’s name was crossed out of the order form and replaced with another 
(A____ GmbH), in order to seller the omnibuses in Switzerland. Note that the seller knew what 
was going on. The effects of this would lead to a situation where the buyer could purchase the 
omnibuses for a cheaper price in Austria than in Switzerland. However the omnibuses were 
never delivered to A____ GmbH. Furthermore because the omnibuses were to be delivered to 
Switzerland, the seller had to adapt them to comply with Swiss statutory vehicle regulations. 
This meant that they would be new buses as opposed to the standard ones stipulated under the 
contract by the parties. Upon receipt of the vehicles, the seller issued a guarantee, which 
existed for two years or 200 000 km on the engine, gear box and rear suspension and  a second 
guarantee which for eighteen months or 50 000 km on the rest of the vehicle excluding parts 
subject to wear and tear. As the vehicle could not be registered in Switzerland, another party 
(S____ GmbH) made its Austrian license available, with himself as the named registered owner 
and consequently concluded an insurance contract with the plaintiff (insurance provider).  
 
In order to complete the chain of sale to the buyer, a sales contract (Pro forma) was entered 
into between the buyer and A____ GmbH. The purchase price was financed by a Swiss 
corporation (U____ AG) under an installation contract, of which comprehensive insurance 
would be ceded to that corporation. As a result title to the goods was transferred to U____ AG 
at the time when delivery was affected to the buyer and in turn the buyer would bear the risk of 
non-insurable depreciations or destruction of the goods. 
 
The non-conformity with regard to this case revolved around the fact that after using the 
vehicles it had become apparent that the air-conditioning systems were not functioning 
properly. This became apparent when smoke began to emanate from the air-conditioning unit, 
which led to the bus catching fire and burning out completely. Accordingly the non-conformity 
revolved around the improper installation of the air-conditioning unit. It could not however be 
determined which intervening party was responsible for this.  The insurance was subsequently 
paid out to U____ AG; with this the buyer settled his installment contract and consequently 
initiated proceedings against the seller. 
 
 The court of first instance interpreted the factual basis and attributed fault to the seller as to the 
non-conformity of the goods, without considering Article 79. It furthermore stated that deal 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
P a g e  | 37 
 
with A____ GmbH was a “sham transaction” and the actual transaction was between the buyer 
and seller. Also the buyer had assigned comprehensive insurance to U____ AG and therefore 
the plaintiff (insurer) could reclaim the insurance sum. 
 
 The appeal court however totally dismissed the court a quo’s judgment, nevertheless it adopted 
its factual findings. It stated that the seller had acted as dealer, who had acquired goods from a 
producer to which it noted that any defect could not have been detected prior to the occurrence 
of the damage. Consequently the dealer could not hold the obligation to conduct a technical 
examination of harmless factory parts before they were resold. Furthermore the inspection of 
the air-conditioning system would be a complex procedure.  
 
For the purposes of this discussion it is their analysis of Article 79 that is important. The court 
noted that the requirement of Article 79 seems to align itself with that of Austrian law (ABGB). 
In which it reasoned that, for the fact, that the seller had not installed the air-conditioning 
system, inevitably its installation was beyond his control.  
 
‘Moreover, it could not be reasonably expected from [Seller] to have examined the installation, especially 
since considerable technical efforts would be necessary and [Seller] was not expected to reckon with any 
such defect’.238  
 
According to the CISG the seller could not have been expected to take the impediment into 
consideration at the time of conclusion of the contract and as a result it is not reasonable for the 
seller to have taken steps to avoid the impediment. 
 
 The appeal court then went on to an analysis of Article 79(2) and concluded that according to 
literature and jurisprudence the term third party seems to refer to persons assisting in the 
performance. The court notes that according to literature, the persons who may be classified as 
“third parties” are divergent. However this case presented an issue not of persons who had to 
affect performance to the obligee, but of persons whose performance was auxiliary so that 
performance could be affected. To this the court stated that the obvious functioning of the 
CISG according to the opinions contained in literature was that, the seller could be excused if 
he met the requirements of Article 79(1). The appeal court held that,  
 
‘Even applying the strictest of opinions would not help the Plaintiff [Insurer], because any potential buyer 
-- thus, A____ GmbH as well as [Buyer] -- must have been aware that [Seller] could only have acquired 
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the bus from the German producer ([1st Intervening Party]). Therefore, [Seller] had no possibility to 
choose its supplier’.239 
 
Ultimately it was held that the seller had met the requirements of Article 79 and consequently 
exempted. The matter was then referred to the federal court of which it found the appeal court’s 
decision to be justified and admissible.  
 
Following the interpretation of Article 79 to the issue of non-conformity of goods considered in 
1999, the next case seems to be a retackling of the issue. This case was decided in the 
Hovioikeus / hovrätt (Appellate Court) of Finland in 2005 and is known as the Radiated Spice 
case.240 This case involves a Spanish seller and a Finnish buyer who had contracted for the sale 
of paprika powder to be used in various spice mixes for further sale. The non-conformity 
revolved around the way the spices had been treated in order to reduce the microbial levels 
contained within. The contract had specified that it be steam-treated however laboratory 
analysis had determined that the spice had actually been treated with radiations. The apparent 
issue was that according to a directive issued by the European Union all consumer products 
treated with radiation had to be clearly marked as such. The issue as illustrated by the buyer 
was that, Finnish customers were not fond of purchasing consumable products that were treated 
with radiation. Consequently the product was, useless with regard to its intended use. The 
issues before the court were numerous, these being: had the buyer given notice on time? Was 
the seller in breach of the contract based on the fact that he supplied radiated goods? If in 
breach, did such breach cause damage? What is the quantum of the damages? Was the seller 
liable for damages? 
 
However with regard to the conformity of goods contained within Article 35(1) of the CISG 
the court stated that despite the fact that the contract did not exclude the use of radiation 
treatment, that based on the fact that the buyer and seller were experienced in their field, the 
seller should have taken cognizance of the directive and as a result. Radiation treatment should 
not have even been considered.  
 
Furthermore, with regard to Article 79, the seller had argued that he could not be liable for 
factors beyond his control, in that the party who had delivered the goods could have been the 
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one that had radiated the goods. 241 Concerning this argument the court discussed the provisions 
of Article 79(1) and 79(2). With regard to Article 79(2) it had concluded the position that 
various other courts had reached as to whom a third party may be. It established that ‘Article 
79(2) does not include suppliers of the goods or of raw materials to the seller.’242 Consequently 
it created a more detailed definition of who a third party is by stating further that, ‘If the party 
engaging in performance is not considered to be a third person within the meaning of Article 
79(2), this party is part of the personal risk of the promisor.’243 
 
The court went on to consider the opinion of Honnold, particularly that delivery of defective 
goods is not excusable under Article 79. It also took consideration of the cases within German 
and French law244 stating that this issue had to date been left open. The court finally concluded 
that the district court had established that the sales agreement had bound both the seller and the 
buyer, consequently the seller had been aware of the EU directive and furthermore that the 
seller had the responsibility to label any goods that had been radiated. 
 
 Additionally the seller held the obligation to provide goods in conformity with the contract and 
was liable for radiated goods, as a result the court stated that ‘It was not a question of an 
impediment beyond the Seller's control as required by Article 79(1).’245 Accordingly the court 
of appeal upheld the decision of the district court and stated that the seller had not satisfied the 
burden of proof that the failure to perform was based on an impediment “beyond his control”. 
The court reasoned that the seller normally bears the risk for his suppliers. However the court 
also noted that with due consideration given to the Flippe Christian v. Douet Sport Collections 
case, the seller could have been successful. Due to the fact that the buyer rarely has a 
contractual relationship with the seller’s supplier, the approach that the seller be exempt from 
liability based on the conduct of the supplier seems unfair to the buyer.  
 
The court makes an important recommendation that, 
 
‘The impediment in sense of Article 79 ought to be defined strictly to unpredictable events outside the 
sphere of influence of the party in breach’.246 
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This illustrates that the court is of the opinion that the scope of impediments permissible should 
be a limited one, so as to not allow for all impediments in the broadest interpretation of the 
word. The court also dismissed the sellers claim as it was of the opinion that Article 79 is not 
applicable in the case of hidden defects. Furthermore with regard to Article 79(2) the court 
stated that the supplier should have also conformed to the requirements as set out in Article 
79(1) for Article 79(2) to be satisfied. It note that to this requirement, it would be difficult for a 
seller to establish this in order to be exempt under Article 79(2). 
 
This case is very interesting as it is the first case in which it can be observed that all sources 
with regard to non-conformity of goods, existing as an impediment are thoroughly discussed. 
Note that the discussion of these sources has already been discussed and as a result there is no 
need to revisit them again in this part. Ultimately the court makes a statement that seems to be 
true upon the analysis of the available case law, which is that ‘the argumentations of the courts 
are surprisingly short and do not go deeply into the problems of Article 79.’247 
 
The next case illustrates the approach to the issue under arbitration. The matter was heard 
before the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission in china in 2007. 
This case is known as the Hammer Mill case.248 In this case we have a German seller and a 
Chinese buyer, who had executed two agreements, one was a sale and purchase agreement, the 
other was a technical support agreement for the supply of hammer mills (hereafter 
“equipment”).  
 
The defect was that after the equipment had been used, their flaws had become apparent. In 
2005 the equipment had broken down due to 3 flaws, which where: ‘(1) three impact boards 
were broken; (2) hammer heads and clamping rings on the heads fell apart; and (3) pins and 
hammer heads wore out.’249 To remedy the situation, the seller’s engineers had examined the 
parts that the seller replaced for free. However in 2006 the equipment broken down again, due 
to the fact that ‘(1) the hammer heads wore out and could not be used; and (2) the cable lines in 
the electrical heating system of the auxiliary equipment broke down.’250 On response to this the 
seller replaced the parts for free again. However it was at this time that the end-user had 
claimed that the replacements delivered were either non-conforming or that quantitatively there 
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was a shortage. It was at this time that the buyer claimed that hammer heads didn’t conform to 
the specifications as provided within the contract and alleged that it was for this fact that the 
equipment kept breaking down. Subsequently the buyer moved for arbitration.  
 
The arbitrators held in favour of the buyer. What is important for our purposes is the way in 
which the arbitrators handled Article 79. The arbitrators considered the hammer heads supplied 
in 2004, to which they stated that the hammer heads were an integral part of the hammer mills 
and those supplied by the seller did not in fact conform to the specifications as set out under the 
contract. Consequently the arbitrators established that this was a fundamental breach for the 
purposes of the CISG. 
 
Furthermore, because the buyer had contracted with the seller to provide hammer heads 
customized to its needs within the contract and the buyer had paid extra fees for this, the 
argument of the seller, that he could not have obtained the required hammer heads could not 
convince the Arbitration Tribunal that the seller would satisfy the requirements to be exempted 
under Article 79. It was the arbitration tribunal’s reasoning that the seller ‘should have the 
chance to change the contract terms to avoid this upon negotiating the contract.’251  
 
The next time that we find this issue discussed was in the Appellate Court Hamburg of 
Germany on 25 January 2008, this case is known as the Café Inventory case.252 In this case we 
have a buyer from Spain and a seller from the Netherlands. The facts progress as follows, a 
Spanish company had concluded contracts for the purchase of fittings and equipment for ice 
cream production to be used in an ice café. According to the contract the seller had the 
obligation of making the items available in a ready to use condition at the ice café in Palma de 
Mallorca, subject to a deadline contained within the contract. However this deadline was 
postponed, by consensus of both parties. Note that the contract also contained a penalty clause.  
 
Later the fittings and equipment had been delivered, however they had not been installed. In 
response to this the buyer had granted the seller additional time to have the equipment installed. 
The seller had failed to install the equipment in a ready to use condition and the buyer had the 
contract declared void. The fittings and equipment had been stored and under a court order, its 
value had later been realized. The realization thereof was in order to cover the storage costs. 
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Note that according to an assignment document of the buyer’s CEO,  stated all claims that the 
buyer had against the seller would be assigned to the CEO and the buyer’s respective assignees. 
It was these parties who brought a claim against the seller with regard to repayment of the 
purchase price and an enforcement of the contractual penalty. They had claimed that the seller 
had delivered defective and incomplete goods and had failed to install the items. The seller had 
died in the meantime and it was his successor who claimed that, buyer had failed to send notice 
of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time period and that they could not have installed 
the goods due to the fact that the buyer had not provided a space for them to do the 
installations. 
 
When the matter came before the court of first instance (District Court), the claim had 
dismissed, reasoning that the buyer’s assignee’s action was not justified, on the grounds that 
they had not embraced all of the joint creditors and they were as a result not entitled to claim 
performance without the others. 
 
On appeal, with regard to Article 79, the appeal court had stated that the buyer was entitled to 
claim the contractual penalty, as it was undisputed that the seller had failed to install the 
equipment in a ready to use condition. Furthermore they stated that seller had no right to rely 
on any excuse that would relieve him of his obligation to effect instillation in the agreed upon 
condition. Moreover any possible excuse would have had to have been determined with regard 
to the applicable law of the contract, which is to say, the CISG or German law. To this the 
appeal court reiterated the statement that the seller could not be excused but went on to discuss 
Article 79 nevertheless. 
 
 According to the CISG, the seller would only be excused if ‘due to an unforeseeable 
impediment beyond his control (Art. 79(1)) or due to conduct on the part of [Buyer] (Art. 80) 
the inventory for ice cream production could not be installed’253 or according to German law, if 
he was not legally responsible for the failure to install. Furthermore the court considered the 
undisputed fact that the sellers technician had returned from a trip without having installed the 
equipment in a ready to use condition. To the submission by the seller that the buyer had not 
provided a suitable space within which to install the goods, the court found that even if the 
submission was correct, the seller still held the obligation to assemble the goods on the 
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premises, to the best of his ability. The issue with the premises was the sole concern of the 
buyer and the seller should have nevertheless prepared the goods so that it could be later be put 
into operation as a result, this didn’t constitute an impediment. Consequently ‘The failure to 
install by the personnel is to be attributed to [Seller], either by way of Art. 79(1) CISG’254 or 
under German law.  
 
Ultimately the court ordered that the buyer’s assignees were entitled to contractual damages as 
well as interest thereon pursuant to Article 74 and 78 of the CISG and determined according to 
the applicable national law under German conflict of law rules. 
 
Within the same year, the issue of non-conformity under Article 79 had come before the 
District Court Maastricht in the Netherlands. This case is known as Agristo N.V. v. Macces 
Agri B.V.255. This case has a seller from Belgium and a buyer from the Netherlands. The facts 
are as follows: the buyer was a company whose primary business was the processing of 
potatoes, in which it sold them as a deep frozen product. The buyer concluded a forward 
contract with potato growers, this contract covered 60 per cent of the buyer’s needed potatoes, 
and the rest was bought on the free market. The seller was a farming company, which 
specialized in grain, corn and potatoes. They concluded a contract in which the seller would 
supply 440 tons of a certain type of potatoes to the buyer.  
 
Extreme weather conditions however resulted in a lower yield and inferior quality of the 
potatoes. To this the seller noted that he had 440 tons of potatoes, although based on their 
inferior quality, the ability to stock the potatoes had become problematic, as a result the seller 
sought to dispose of the stock on a very short date during inspection by the buyers 
representative. However the buyer did not want to accept the potatoes at this time as other 
growers had declared their yield as well and he could not stock all of the goods at the same 
time. Later when the buyer was ready to accept the goods, the quality of the potatoes had 
plummeted. The seller nevertheless delivered 257,100 kilos. The buyer had requested the goods 
be washed and after washing it was discovered that only 155,240 kilos were left. The buyer 
however refused delivery of only 36,340 kilos, however he later accepted after discount based 
on the unladen weight of the remaining potatoes and requested delivery of the remainder on a 
later date. The delivery did not take place and the buyer subsequently terminated the contract. 
                                                 
254 (Café inventory case) supra (n252). 
255 (Agristo N.V. v. Macces Agri B.V.)- District Court (Rechtbank) Maastricht 9 July 2008 [120428 / HA ZA 07-
550] available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080709n1.html accessed on 20 July 2015. 
P a g e  | 44 
 
The buyer therefore had to replace the potatoes that he should have received from the seller and 
sought the payment of the sum as damages plus interest on the main claim.  
 
With regard to Article 79 the seller made the submission that it could not fulfill its obligation to 
deliver the required amount due to the extreme weather conditions. Consequently, that the 
weather conditions and its effects on the harvest of the buyer were beyond the control of the 
seller and since such weather conditions are rare to Maastricht, the seller could not have taken 
them into consideration at the time of the conclusion of the contract. The buyer rejected this 
argument, stating that the weather conditions and consequences are to be taken into account by 
the seller and therefore the seller bears the risk. The buyer also submitted that based on the 
performance under the other forward contracts, that the weather conditions were not that bad. 
Furthermore, that the buyer had enough potatoes to sell to third parties and as a result should 
not have sold their entire stock but reserved some of the stock in anticipation of the weather 
conditions. Finally the buyer argued that the potatoes were an indeterminate obligation, 
meaning that he could acquire potatoes elsewhere in order to fulfill his respective contractual 
obligations. 
 
The court refused the buyers argument that the weather conditions were not beyond the seller’s 
control and the seller could have obtained the remaining amount of potatoes elsewhere. The 
court reasoned that the seller was not a trader but a farmer, therefore the argument that he could 
have obtained the potatoes elsewhere was not sound and only guaranteed under the forward 
contract to deliver potatoes grown on his own land. However it has to be noted that the court 
subscribed to the buyers argument in general, it is expected of a diligent farmer to not sell his 
whole crop without giving due consideration to weather conditions affecting the harvest. 
 Consequently it noted that: 
 
‘It can be expected from a diligent grower that he considers the weather circumstances when entering into 
a sales contract concerning future harvest insofar that he can fulfill his duty to deliver in 90[per cent] of 
the cases. This means, in the instant case, that [Seller] can only rely on an impediment beyond control, if 
the harvest stayed behind the minimum of crop achieved in 90[per cent] of the years’.256 
 
The court ultimately held that the matter be referred for a later court session. This case doesn’t 
critically discuss Article 79 however what it does provide is that weather conditions could exist 
as an impediment however it has to be read in conjunction with the due consideration given in 
a particular field. E.g. if it was a farmer it would be more difficult to dispute that you should 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
P a g e  | 45 
 
exempted under Article 79 because the requirement of taking the weather into account would 
hold a lot of weight in this regard.  
 
The final case discussed was heard in 2012 in the Audiencia Provincial de Murcia of Spain. 
This case is known as the Red Pepper Powder Case257in which we have a Spanish seller and a 
buyer from the Netherlands. The two contracting parties had concluded a series of sale and 
purchase contracts for red chilli powder. The dispute revolved around five batches of the chilli 
power containing unauthorized colourants, these colours were Sudan Red and Para Red. 
According to the buyer, the unauthorized colourants made the goods effectively unfit for 
human consumption and as a result amounted to a fundamental defect which gave effect to a 
fundamental breach of contract. Furthermore the buyer believed that various European and 
Spanish food regulations had been breached. As a result, the buyer was claiming for the loss 
and damages caused by the fundamental breach. 
 
Of importance is that this case came forward at the time at which, illegal food colourants in 
food and chilli products had caused the food crisis in Europe. This resulted in the European 
Union issuing an order to withdraw all food products that were deemed to have more than the 
permitted amount of contaminant. ‘The Court considered that it could not rule on the breach of 
the European regulations’.258 
 
With regard to four of the five batches the court held that the existence of contaminants was not 
due to any intentional policy due to the seller, but instead occurred due to a chance 
contamination of the environment or the processing machinery. With regard to the processing 
machinery the court surmised that it could have been due to the ‘the use of lubricants in the 
machines, the packaging used or the printing ink on the bags’.259  Furthermore within these 4 
batches the level of contaminants was quite low however in the fifth batch the level clearly 
exceeded the minimum standard. This batch was made with red pepper skins obtained from 
Uzbekistan. Based on this the seller claimed that in terms of Article 79, the effects could not 
have been foreseen. 
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Concerning the requirement of foreseeability the court reasoned that the seller operated in an 
industry in which safety concerns were of the highest importance. Nevertheless the presence of 
contaminates (colourants) was not however uncommon in this industry. Furthermore 
concerning the pepper skins acquired from Uzbekistan, ‘the first time that it had been bought 
from that country — and the pepper skins had been added in the interests of improving safety, 
which already indicated some lack of confidence in the product, particularly since other illegal 
colourants had been detected in another batch’260. Accordingly the court held that the 
requirement of unforseeability had not been met. 
 
The court concluded that the buyer had to buy replacement goods and was claiming the 
difference, to this the court stated that the claim for damages had to be dismissed as the case 
did not concern the remedy of avoidance of the contract, consequently the substitute transaction 
was not of importance in this case. 
 
After a look into the applicable case law what has become apparent is that, it seems to be the 
position of various judicial bodies that the delivery of non-conformity goods does exist as an 
impediment for the purposes of Article 79. However there is a disheartening side to what has 
been observed, which is that most of the courts seem to identify that the issue as to its 
applicability remains unresolved without establishing if whether the delivery of non-
conforming goods does exist as an impediment. This is particularly observable amongst 
German Courts. Nevertheless, despite highlighting this fact they go about establishing if 
whether the parties are exempt under Article 79. The disheartening irony is that upon 
researching the various sources what has become apparent is that, most bodies that discuss the 
matter remain merely persuasive, to this I add the CISG-AC, therefore it only stands to reason 
that it is these judicial bodies that will be the entities to provide the conclusive answer however 
they all seem to hedge around the issue. 
 
CHAPTER 4: AN ANSWER DETERMINED THROUGH 
THE LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 
 
Before analyzing which of the relevant approaches should be adopted with regard to the issue 
at hand, it is important to briefly revisit the arguments provided. It had previously been 
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discussed that there are two major contributors to the debate as to whether the delivery of non-
conforming goods exists as an excuse for the purpose of Article 79.261 
 
The first contributor being John Honnold, who had asserted, that based on the discussions 
within the drafting history, it had been decided that the delivery of non-conforming goods is 
not excusable under Article 79. The second author is Peter Schlechtriem who asserts that the 
delivery of non-conforming goods does exists as an impediment for the purposes of Article 79, 
he rationalizes that the existence of a defect would result in incomplete performance and that 
the wording of Article 79 does not suggest a limitation on what may constitute an impediment. 
Furthermore I had argued that the wording of Article 79 namely the use of the words “any of 
his obligations” would denote that based on the sellers obligations to provide conforming 
goods, that he could be excused because the wording of Article 79 refers to ‘any obligations’ of 
which Article 35 states that there is a duty to deliver goods which conform to the standards as 
provided under the contract. 
 
Based on these two arguments, two fundamental point may be gleaned. First, that one of the 
arguments is based on the legislative intent of the negotiating parties and the other is based on 
the wording of the provision, and based on this, secondly, the wording of the provision does 
not as a result reflect the intention of the negotiating parties. Starting from this points we move 
onto an interpretation of treaties to establish which source should be preferred. Should we 
accept the legislative intent? Or should we accept the black letter texts of Article 79 as it 
currently reads? 
 
4.1  Interpretation under the CISG 
4.1.1 Article 7: Interpretative Rules under the CISG 
Before going through the different approaches to the interpretation of treaties, it has to be 
asserted that the CISG contains its very own guide as to interpretation of its provisions. Note 
however that this guide is not without its own issues. 
 
The governing interpretative provisions as to the interpretation of CISG provisions can be 
found in Chapter II of Part 1 of the CISG titled “General Provisions”. Furthermore chapter II 
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contains two article which relate to the interpretation of the convention, these being Article 7 
and Article 8. For our purposes however, only Article 7 is applicable as Article 8 does not 
concern the interpretation of the Convention itself but refers to the interpretation of CISG 
contracts.262  Pressing forward, Article 7 reads as follows: 
 
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need 
to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade. 
 
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to 
be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such 
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law. 
 
Accordingly Article 7 mandates that any court or arbitral tribunal interpreting the Convention 
should ‘pay due regard to the Convention’s international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and the observation of good faith in international trade’263. 
Scholars often state that the drafting parties had included Article 7 in order to curtail the threat 
of divergent interpretations of the provisions by courts and arbitral tribunals of the different 
parties.264   
 
Note that a divergent interpretation poses two threats to a uniform interpretation in the current 
context.  First that it is considered ‘an obstacle to predictability of legal situations and [this 
threat would] prevent the parties from relying on a uniform application of the conventions’ 
provisions in the various contracting states’265 and secondly that it may lead to forum 
shopping.266 Based on the above, interpreters of the CISG have been urged to follow an 
autonomous interpretation of the CISG, free from domestic legal concepts or interpretations 
that have common law or civil law origin.267 
 
With regard to the issue of non-conformity of goods existing as an impediment for the purpose 
of Article 79 however it can be noted, based on the analysis of the case law268 that divergent 
interpretations does not seem to be an issue at all. It seems that most courts and arbitral 
tribunals seem to agree, although not expressed in words but by their actions, that Article 79 
does exempt the delivery of non-conforming goods. 
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 Furthermore I draw the reader’s attention to another issue with regard to Article 7, as posed by 
Anna Veneziano, which is that, 
 
 ‘This provision… has been however aptly described as a policy rule which does not give a precise 
indication of the best way to attain the desired result’.269  
 
Plainly put she is saying that this provision is nothing more than a guide, it does not help in the 
interpretation of any of the provisions and it is a provision that merely reminds interpreters that 
there are certain criteria that have to be established when one looks at the interpretation that 
had been provided. Peter Schlechtriem also notes that the CISG does not lay down methods of 
interpretation, instead it only offers principles that should be followed and furthermore states 
that Article 7(2) provides that interpretation must be done with regard to the Convention as a 
result one cannot rely on domestic interpretive methods.270 
 
Therefore, to the current debate we note that Article 7 is only applicable with regard to the 
guidelines one should use when interpreting the provision. Consequently, it does not tell us 
exactly which interpretative approach should be followed. However for the sake of 
completeness I will explain the guidelines as contained in Article 7. According to Peter Huber 
and Alastair Mullis (hereafter “Huber and Mullis”), Article 7 contains three guidelines271:   
 
The first guideline, illustrated in Article 7(1), is the concept of “international character”.272 This 
concept aligns itself with the fact that that interpreter should seek an autonomous interpretation 
of any CISG provision273. An autonomous interpretation would mean that ‘ [the] words or 
phrases in the CISG should not simply be regarded as having the same meaning as identical 
words or phrases that exist in the domestic legal system’.274  
 
Furthermore it had been advocated that the first guideline and the second are ‘functionally 
interrelated and independent as well’275, these two concepts are “international character” and 
“uniformity”. This is due to the fact that in order to take into account the CISG’s “international 
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character” ‘consideration is to be given to the international framework of the application and 
permanent development of uniform law rules’276.  
 
Additionally Huber and Mullis assert that instead the provision should be interpreted to have a 
“CISG- meaning” which would be based on the ‘structure and … underlying policies [of the 
CISG] as well as… its drafting and negotiating history’.277 I do not agree with this view, the 
reason why we cannot use the drafting and negotiating history will be discussed later. 
 
The second guideline is the concept of “uniformity”, which means that any court or tribunal 
should interpret the provision in the exact same way and reach the same conclusion.278  Huber 
and Mullis believe that this is impossible in the absence of a supranational court that has 
binding powers.279  Consequently, it is also important to distinguish between “uniform 
interpretation” and “uniform application”.  Joseph Lookofsky defines these concepts as 
follows, 
 
‘Uniform interpretation suggests that different courts (and arbitral tribunals) should attribute the same 
meaning to the convention text, whereas uniform application suggests that the different decision-makers 
who decide (similar) CISG cases should achieve similar results’.280 
 
This is important as it shows that a uniform interpretation is not only necessary but would 
greatly assist and benefit a uniform application as mentioned under the first guideline. 
 
The third and final guideline is the concept of “good faith”. It has been noted that the meaning 
of this concept is not entirely clear internationally.281 This is particularly problematic when one 
imports the first guideline which calls for an autonomous interpretation of CISG provision, the 
question would then be what is the concept of “good faith” according to the CISG?282 Note, 
however, that the answer to this question is not the focus of this dissertation, in fact it would 
require a dissertation itself, and as a result it will not be discussed but merely noted. I reason 
this based on the fact that the non-determination of this concept will not affect the result of this 
dissertation. However for the sake of interest, Joseph Lookofsky states that scholarly 
commentary suggests that “good Faith” is linked to the concept of “reasonableness” and 
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consequently the concept of “reasonableness” is able to meet a multitude of “good Faith” needs 
within the CISG.283 
 
It would appear that Article 7(1), for the purpose of this dissertation offers very little 
assistance. This is due to the fact that the arguments had already been supplied and as a result 
we are merely looking into which of the arguments should be adopted in light of the sources it 
stems from. 
4.1.2 Tools for the Interpretation of CISG Provision 
Huber and Mullis have stated that when interpreting the CISG, first, respect must be given to 
the guideline contained within Article 7(1) and, second, the interpreting body must use the 
available tools to determine the meaning of a provision.284  These tools according to them are: 
the wording of the provision285, the travaux preparatoires or drafting history, the purpose of 
the provision and the underlying policy, finally the position of the provision as read from the 
point of view of the CISG as a whole.286 
 
However it has to be emphasized that the list of interpretive tools of the CISG is in no way 
limited to only those stated by Huber and Mullis. This is evident based on the work of Stefan 
Kröll, Loukas Mistelis and Pilar Perales Viscasillas (hereafter “Kröll, Mistelis and Viscasillas”) 
who adds to the list: the preamble of the CISG287, CISG case law288, doctrines289 and the works 
of the CISG-AC290. Furthermore they seem to convey an observable hierarchy, essentially 
giving rise to the perception that certain tools hold more value than others. 
 
 It is my view that there are two primary interpretative tools and the rest exist as secondary 
tools. This however may not be the opinion of other authors. The first of these primary 
interpretative tools is the literal wording of the provision, additionally it has been stated that the 
CISG has been drafted in various languages and this is a fundamental consideration to take into 
account when assessing a literal interpretation of its provisions.291 However this may be a very 
unreasonable approach to take. For the fact that when a matter concerning the interpretation of 
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CISG provisions comes before a court, that court may only have the resources to determine 
certain versions292 of the CISG.  
 
Additionally, the fact that all version of the CISG should be considered would mean that, 
interpreters versed in the necessary languages, would have to be employed so as to ascertain 
the true meaning of the provisions and consequently would have an impact on the cost of the 
case.  
 
The courts may also run into issues where the CISG as expressed in another official language 
which is not English, give rise to an alternative interpretation of the CISG.293 Based on the 
previous statement, it is the view of Kröll, Mistelis and Viscasillas that ‘Different interpretative 
criteria should be used to avoid the prevalence of…one text over the other; Prima Facie 
preference for the English version should be rejected unless confirmed by other interpretation 
techniques’294.  
 
The second primary interpretative tools is case law, for the fact that it can be used to render and 
promote consistency of interpretations.295 It has to be emphasized that ‘international case law is 
[merely] a persuasive authority’296. It can be argued by the author, that despite the fact that case 
law is not binding, a well-reasoned interpretation of the matter tackled by various courts could 
be very valuable from a developmental perspective.297 Logically, this would give rise to the 
fact that although interpretations may differ, a well-reasoned interpretation may give rise to a 
development of the provisions and ultimately an interpretation that would be considered to be 
correct. 
 
Despite the fact that it is my view that the other tools are secondary, it does not mean that they 
do not offer valuable interpretative insight. The first of these interpretative tools is the 
preamble298. It has been stated that the preamble, ‘is not a mere philosophical- legal declaration 
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of principles’299 , it offers valuable insight into the interpretation of the provisions of the 
Convention, particularly when read together with Article 7(1)300.301 In the view of Kröll, 
Mistelis and Viscasillas, 
 
‘The preamble emphasizes the goals of the convention as also provided in Article 7 [and furthermore] the 
goals of removing legal barriers and promoting the development of international trade, [which helps to] 
understand the dynamic approach of the convention towards its interpretation’.302 
 
The second of these secondary interpretative tools is the travaux preparatoires. Its importance 
stems from the fact that ‘[it is relevant] in order to understand the evolution of the rules of the 
Convention and thus to apprehend [the provisions] finality and correctness’303. Furthermore, its 
importance is evident within the context of Article 7(2), with regard to discerning internal and 
external gaps.304 However it has been cautioned that too much reliance on this should be 
avoided.305  
 
The question therefore posed is, why has John Honnold, relied so heavily on the travaux 
preparatoires? The only reasonable conclusion is that, this is due to the fact that the travaux 
preparatoires provides a definitive answer. The fact that so many scholars have followed his 
line of reasoning and adopted his argument as fact would mean that a new development with 
regard to the authoritative nature of the drafting history can be perceived. Which is that, when 
it provides a conclusive determination, consequently its level of authority increases. 
 
Finally the other secondary tools can be grouped together, as ‘scholarly works’. Two of these 
are: doctrines by scholars and the other being the works of the CISG-AC. These have already 
been expressed in case law and discussed in the in chapters two and three of this dissertation, 
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their importance as an interpretive tool can be gauged from their use and, therefore, do not have 
to be restated. 
 
Despite the hierarchy, Peter Schlechtriem however is of the opinion that when interpreting 
CISG provisions it is the literal meaning, or the wording of the provision that is important.306 
Only when this meaning cannot be ascertained from the wording should we turn to the travaux 
preparatoires.307 Which seems to be the process through which he had reached his 
determination that the delivery of non-conforming goods can be excused under Article 79.  
 
Kröll, Mistelis and Viscasillas on the other hand tend to align themselves with the fact that an 
interpretation should first follow a dynamic and progressive approach.308 Which should take 
into consideration the : case law, new international uniform instruments, development of 
practices and usage , scholarly works, new interpretative methods and evolution in legal 
thinking.309 Second if after this analysis ambiguity and uncertainty still remains we should look 
into the travaux preparatoires and finally the unofficial commentary of the secretariat.310 
Although their approach is more detailed, they seem to neglect the literal interpretation of the 
wording and as a result I believe that Peter Schlechtriem’s approach would be the more 
simplistic and cost effective approach to adopt. Note that although all of the tools have not 
been discussed, this serves to merely illustrate the vast amount of interpretative tools available 
in order to ascertain the meaning of a CISG provision. 
 
4.2  Interpretation of Treaties: A Solution through the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties 1980 
4.2.1 Schools Of Thought Regarding Treaty Interpretation 
Before the creation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 also known 
as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (“hereafter “VCLT”), interpretation of 
treaties was based on the applicable schools of thought.311 These schools of thought are often 
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referred to as the canons of treaty interpretation.312 There are in essence five schools of 
thought: the Intention school; the Textual school; the Teleological school; the New Haven 
school313 and finally the Sociological school.314 
 
Briefly the Intention school finds its premise in the notion that when interpreting a treaty, the 
intention of the parties must be determined.315 The determination can be ascertained by way of 
looking into:  
 
‘The conduct of the parties, prior and subsequent to the treaty, the historical background, the aims and 
objectives of the parties sought to be effected in the treaty, the other provisions of the treaty which 
compare or contrast with the provision in dispute, the practice of the parties in making like provisions and 
their conduct thereunder, other extrinsic circumstances prevailing at the time of the conclusion of the 
treaty’.316 
 
Essentially this refers to the use of the travaux preparatoires. This school however is not 
widely recognized as applicable when one seeks the interpretation of a multilateral treaty, for 
the fact that it mainly relies on the drafting history.317 The reason for this is due to the fact that, 
  
‘The nature of a multilateral treaty and its negotiation does not admit of the free use of preparatory work, 
in that the negotiations are usually the work of a few important parties… a treaty open to accession since 
the acceding parties have had no participation in the preparatory work and are deemed to have accepted 
only the text of the treaty and the formal reservations thereto ’.318 
 
Based on the above quote it would be unfair to bind a party to what had been decided during 
the drafting and negotiation of the treaty, due to the fact that they had not participated. 
 
The Textual school believes that the text as it reads is an embodiment of the intention as 
expressed during the treaties negotiation and drafting.319 ‘Furthermore, treaties must be 
interpreted as they stand, and subject to the limitations inherent in the fact that they only 
contain so many articles, phrases, and words’.320 Gerald Fitzmaurice stated that under this 
approach the court is not allowed to interpret a provision based on its intended meaning but 
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must ascertain the meaning based on the actual wording of the provision or its actual 
meaning.321  
 
The Teleological school seeks an interpretation based on the “object “and “purpose” of the 
treaty itself.322 This is determined in accordance with Article 19 (a) of the draft convention to 
the VCLT, which are ‘the historical background of the treaty, the subsequent conduct of the 
parties, the circumstances surrounding the adoption and interpretation of the treaty, and travaux 
preparatoires’.323 Note that the draft convention does not place a hierarchy on the sources as to 
which should be preferred; this is the principle difference between the Intention and Textual 
schools and the Teleological school.324   
 
The New Haven School seeks an interpretation based on ‘the genuine shared expectations of 
the parties, subject to overriding community policies’.325 Furthermore Onyeka Nwaigbo notes 
that with regard to this school, a treaty and its drafting history are of equal value.326 However it 
has been cautioned that the use of this school of thought may give rise to a vague 
interpretation.327  
 
The final school of thought is the Sociological school, which has not been applied judicially.328 
Essentially this school is an extension of the Teleological school with the addition that 
intention must conform to the law of social interdependence, meaning that an interpretation 
will not be accepted if it is contrary to social justice.329  
 
Despite the existence of these schools of thought, it has to be understood that now there is a 
convention which exists to govern the law of treaties and their interpretation, this convention is 
the VCLT.  
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The question therefore posed is, now that we have a convention that regulates the interpretation 
of treaties, what does this mean for the existence of these schools? Onyeka Nwaigbo states that 
although the VCLT limits the approach to the interpretation of treaties,  
 
‘The convention does not therefore exclude other principles which are compatible with 
these general rules. In the application of Articles 31 and 32, tribunals have in various 
ways applied these varying methods of interpretation’.330 
 
 However not all scholars think this way, Richard Gardiner makes a statement based on an 
arbitral award handed down by the International Centre for settlement of investment disputes in 
which it was stated that,  
 
‘… The Vienna [Convention on the Law of Treaties] represents a move away from the canons of 
interpretation previously common in treaty interpretation and which erroneously persist in various 
international decisions today’.331  
 
Furthermore, according to Urs Gruber, who comments on the schools of thought with regard to 
Article 7 of the CISG, to which he states that the appropriate way in which to interpret 
provisions under the Convention would be to subscribe to the Teleological school.332  
 
Additionally he states that a purely textual approach to the Convention should not be 
considered, though he does not substantiate this claim.333 I cannot therefore agree with his line 
of reasoning as stated previously it would be unfair to bind parties who have acceded to the 
Convention to an interpretation asserted during the Negotiating and drafting stages of the 
CISG, which is a component of the Teleological school. Accordingly we must therefore 
determine what the VCLT says about the issue of interpretation of Article 79. 
 
4.2.2 The United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT)  
The first step when discussing the applicability and usefulness of the VCLT is to determine 
what it covers and what position a convention has in relation to it. For this we therefore note 
that according to the full name of the VCLT, that it governs the law of “treaties”. As a result 
the term, “treaty” will have to be defined.   
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The VCLT unlike the CISG contains a definitions clause, embodied in Article 2. Within this 
definitions clause we find the term “treaty” defined. Hence Article 2(1)(a) reads as follows: 
 
‘"Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
whatever its particular designation.’ 
 
This definition contains various requirements that have to be met before an international 
agreement can be considered a treaty. These are that the treaty must be an:  “international 
agreement”, “concluded between states”, “in written form”, “ governed by international law”, 
“whether embodied in a single or multiple related instruments”, “whatever its particular 
designation”.334 For the purposes of this discussion it isn’t important to discuss all these 
requirements in order to establish that a convention is a treaty, however what is important is to 
note that the VCLT uses “treaty” as a somewhat flexible generic term.335 Consequently a 
convention can be considered a bilateral or multilateral Treaty.336 ‘The term “bilateral” 
describes a treaty between two states, and “multilateral” [as] one between two or more 
states’.337 Considering the amount of countries338 that are party to the CISG it can only be 
concluded that the CISG represents a multilateral treaty. 
 
The next step is, whether the interpretive guide contained within the VCLT can be applied 
under the CISG, and consequently whether the VCLT is applicable to the CISG? In order to 
determine this we consider Article 4 of the VCLT, which reads as follows: 
 
 ‘… The Convention applies only to treaties which are concluded by States after the entry into force of 
the present Convention with regard to such States.’ 
 
Article 4 is not a complex provision, it states very clearly that the Convention will apply to all 
treaties that have been concluded after the VCLT came into force. Furthermore it has to be 
noted that there is a distinction between the date upon which it was concluded and the date that 
it came into force. The document itself very clearly states that the date upon which it was 
concluded was the 23 May 1969 and the date upon which it had entered into force was the 27 
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January 1980.339 Subsequently the CISG was concluded on the 11 April 1980 and came into 
force on the 1 January 1988.340 This illustrates that the CISG was concluded after the VCLT 
came into force, therefore the VCLT is applicable to the CISG and accordingly its interpretive 
rules contained within are available by application of Article 4. 
 
Now that it has been determined that the VCLT is applicable to the CISG, we can move 
forward to discuss the interpretive provisions within it. ‘The Convention sets out specific legal 
rules of treaty interpretation, in particular a general rule and supplementary means of 
interpretation’341. These interpretive rules are contained in Section 3 titled “Interpretation of 
Treaties” of importance to this dissertation are Articles 31 and 32. 
 
Article 31 sets out the “GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION” and reads as follows: 
 
(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
 
(2) The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes:  
 
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty;  
 
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.  
 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
  
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions;  
 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation;  
 
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A 
special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
 
Paragraph (1) of Article 31 is considered to be the foundation of the interpretive rules.342 
Richard Gardiner states that the general rule under Article 31 follows a ‘process of 
                                                 
339 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (with annex). Available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf accessed on 20 
august 2015. ‘See the date it was concluded on the first page of the document in the heading and see the date it 
was concluded on page 333 at n.1.’ 
340 https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-10&chapter=10&lang=en 
accessed on 20 august 2015. 
341 Enzo Cannizzaro (ed) The Law of Treaties: Beyond the Vienna Convention (2011) 147. 
342 Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein (eds) The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2011) 817.  
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encirclement’.343 Based on its reading this process first starts with the ordinary meaning of the 
terms contained within the treaty, secondly, this ordinary meaning must be read in the context 
of the treaty’s object and purpose and finally it must be read in light of the treaties object an 
purpose.344 Moreover there does not appear to be a hierarchy as to which of these 3 processes 
are more important, therefore an interpreter must use all of them.345 
 
In order to utilize the general rule of interpretation effectively, one has to take cognizance of 
the “means” contained within the provision. Mark Villiger makes reference to the fact that 
there are eight means and that all means should be considered when interpreting.346 Briefly, the 
first is ‘good faith’.347 Good faith essentially exists as a principle, which establishes the conduct 
of the parties when interpreting a treaty.348 This conduct is to ‘act honestly, fairly, reasonably, 
and to refrain from taking unfair advantage’349 when interpreting a treaty.  
 
The second means is to consider the “ordinary meaning” of the terms. The ordinary meaning is 
the ‘current and normal, regular and usual meaning’.350 Note, however, that a term may have 
more than one meaning.351 Despite this fact Anthony August notes that ‘the ordinary meaning 
is most likely to reflect what the parties intended’.352 I do not however agree with this 
statement, for the fact that it totally disregards the argument based on parties who accede to the 
treaty should not be bound to decisions taken in their absence, consequently during the drafting 
history. 
 
 Furthermore Anthony August states that the ordinary meaning can only be ascertained in the 
context of the treaty in light of its object and purpose.353 He furthermore notes that regard to 
this consideration is mainly for the purpose of clarifying an interpretation.354 Of importance 
under the ordinary meaning is the use of generic terms. Richard Gardiner states that, 
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 ‘A “Generic term” includes a known legal term, whose content the parties expected would change over 
time’.355  
 
The third, fourth and fifth means are the “context”, “purpose” and “object” , this had been 
discussed in the sentence above, meaning that the ordinary meaning should be read in light of 
the “context”, “purpose” and “object” of the treaty. Furthermore I add that when considering 
these three terms, one must consider the aim, nature and ends of the treaty as well, which could 
be contained in the treaties preamble of statement of objectives.356 
 
 The next two means are embodied in paragraphs (2), (3)(a) and (3)(b), which all refer to an 
“authentic interpretation”.357 To this Mark Villiger states that collectively paragraphs (2) and 
(3) affirm the concept of a uniform interpretation of the treaty by all parties subject to it.358 
Furthermore Article 2 sets out what the context of the treaty will comprise of. Article 3 denotes 
further sources to be taken into consideration and read together with the context of the treaty as 
establish within paragraph (2). All of these extra sources have the common link to the 
interpretation. 
 
The eighth means is embodied in paragraph (3)(c), which states that the interpretation of the 
treaty must be read against the back drop of, International law as a whole.359  
 
Article 32 sets out the ‘SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF INTERPRETATION’ and reads as 
follows: 
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31 :  
 
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
 
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 
Article 32 is not as complex as Article 31 it provides only one means360 which is that, if after 
an interpretation of Article 31 you are left with an interpretation that is obviously incorrect, 
then you should look into the drafting history of the Convention to ascertain the true meaning 
of the provision. 
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For the purpose of this discussion it is not the way in which you interpret but the school of 
thought that these two provisions represent. It has been made clear by the International Law 
Commission, in their commentary on the draft to the VCLT, that when interpreting a treaty one 
must not give greater weight to the Textual school of thought over any other school of thought 
and vice versa361. Which is observable in paragraph (1), since paragraph (1) embodies aspects 
of both the Textual school of thought as well as the Teleological school of thought.362 This is 
based on the fact that the term “ordinary meaning” encompasses a textual approach and also 
the use of the terms “object and purpose” denotes a reference to the teleological approach of 
interpretation.363 However above all it has been expressed, within the context of Article 31, that 
the textual approach must be given precedence.364 This argument seems to correspond with a 
judgment handed down by the International Court of Justice in the Territorial Dispute, in 
which they held that, 
 
‘[According to Article 31] a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to a term in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Interpretation 
must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’.365 
 
The question that now remains is how does, Article 31 and 32 affect the Issue of whether the 
delivery of non-conforming goods should exist as an impediment for the purposes of Article 
79? 
 
4.2.3  Application Of Article 31 And 32 To The VCLT To The Issue Of The 
Delivery Of Non-Conforming Goods Being Excused Under Article 79 
Of The CISG. 
It is at this point where we derive a more conclusive answer to the issue at hand. The first port 
of call is to reiterate that Article 31 does not embody a purely textual approach, however it has 
clearly been established that a textual approach should take precedence over the other 
applicable approaches to interpretation contained within.  
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Secondly it has to be argued that the way in which these two articles are set out, seems to set a 
hierarchy, note that the hierarchy that I am referring to is not concerning the means embodied 
within but the use of the one article before the other.  This is evident based on the wording of 
Article 32 which simply states that, recourse to it will only be possible if you have first used 
Article 31 and established an incorrect interpretation. There is therefore, a clear division 
between the two articles due to the fact that, Article 31 embodies a textual approach that should 
be read in conjunction with a teleological approach. Whereas reference to the preparatory 
works would indicate an attempt at determining the legislative intent and consequently would 
fall within the Intention school which is embodied in Article 32.  This is fundamentally 
important as John Honnold has created his argument based solely on the travaux preparatoires. 
If we therefore, place his argument into the interpretive guide of Section 3 of the VCLT, it 
would fall perfectly into Article 32 which as stated before is only applicable after Article 31 
has been used. 
 
Therefore the question put forward is, does Peter Schlechtriem argument, which finds its 
premise on the wording of Article 79 of the CISG fit neatly into Article 31 of the VCLT? 
 
In order to determine this we have to use the means as provided earlier. Two points have to be 
stated, first that, Article 31 has to be read as a whole.366 Which illustrates that, the means 
contained within should be read collectively. However this leads us to our second point which 
is that even though all means should be considered, it does not mean that all means are 
applicable.  
 
‘Parties to a treaty are free to agree in the treaty or subsequently to select only some of the means of 
interpretation mentioned in Article 31… and/or to employ different means of interpretation’.367   
 
With this in mind we move on to an analysis of the means in relation to the issue. The first 
means is good faith, which exists as a principle and is not directly applicable to the application 
at hand.  
 
The second means is the ordinary meaning of the terms. Within the context of Article 79 of the 
CISG with due consideration given to the issue and the argument provided by Peter 
Schlechtriem, the relevant terms are: “impediment”, “any” and “obligation”. For the purposes 
of the argument provided by Peter Schlechtriem I would reduce the applicable words to only 
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“impediment” and “obligation”. Therefore first it has to be noted that these two terms are 
generic in nature. Consequently the ordinary meaning of these terms will be the ordinary 
meaning given to a generic term. As stated previously within the means analysis, a generic 
term will encompass all known legal meanings of that term. As a result an “impediment” would 
therefore encompass the delivery of non-conforming goods and an “obligation” would 
encompass the duty to deliver conforming goods.  
 
The third, fourth and fifth means would illustrate that the ordinary meaning must align itself 
with the provision as well as the convention as a whole.  First, in the context of the provision 
itself, Peter Schlechtriem had argued that the use of the word “impediment” does not appear to 
be limited in any way to only certain impediments, secondly the use of the word “any” in 
relation to “obligations” denotes that all obligations should be considered.  Accordingly the 
inclusion of obligation of delivering conforming goods is supported by Article 35 of the CISG 
under the “obligations of the seller”.   Additionally the preamble does not suggest that such an 
interpretation will be in contravention of the Convention. 
 
It is at this point that I discuss paragraph (4) of Article 31 of the VLCT which governs special 
meaning of terms. Mark Villiger has stated that,  
 
‘To interpret a rule is to assign a meaning to the words contained therein. The meaning of words are not 
ironclad: words can mean many things to many people. This is confirmed in Article 31, which deals on 
paragraph 4 with “special” meaning of terms’.368 
 
However despite this paragraph (4) refers to special meaning of provisions based on the 
intention of the parties.369 For this I draw on John Honnold’s argument that it was the intention 
of the parties to not include the delivery of non-conforming goods as an “impediment”.370 
However this argument cannot stand as there is nothing in the Convention itself to suggest that 
this is the intention of the parties. Furthermore to rely on this argument would essentially mean 
that we are relying on the travaux preparatoires, as it finds its basis within the travaux 
preparatoires. This would effectively give rise to a situation where we bind the newly acceded 
countries to a decision taken in their absence, in my view this would give rise to an unfair and 
unreasonable interpretation. 
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The final three means give rise to an “authentic interpretation” which is a uniform 
interpretation, contained in agreements or documents that had been decided by all the parties. 
To which, for the purposes of the issue at hand, there are none. As a result we are led back to 
what had been stated before, that not all of the means are applicable. 
 
Finally an answer has been derived. It appears that Peter Schlechtriem’s argument falls 
squarely within Article 31 and provides a clear cut answer. Based on the interpretive guide 
under Section 3 of the VCLT, we should first interpret under Article 31. Accordingly, if an 
incorrect interpretation had been derived, then we should move towards an analysis of the 
supplementary material under Article 32.  In the context of the issue of the delivery of non-
conforming goods existing as an impediment for the purposes of Article 79 of the CISG, the 
answer will therefore come from Peter Schlechtriem. Consequently the delivery of non-
conforming goods does exist as an impediment, which can be excused under Article 79 of the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980). 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
Before revisiting the conclusive analysis, what has to be noted is that this dissertation does not 
undermine the importance of the interpretative guide contained within Article 7 of the CISG.371 
Article 7 holds valuable principles that should always be taken into account and as a result, the 
author has tried to embody these principles in his interpretation of Article 79 of the CISG. 
Nevertheless, Article 7, unfortunately does not provide any actual rules that can be used in 
order to gauge the true meaning of the CISG’s provisions and it is for this fact, that we find the 
importance and applicability of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. With this in mind we 
therefore move on to the conclusive remarks. 
 
It has been argued in this dissertation, with due regard given to Articles 31 and 32 of the 
VCLT, that Peter Schlechtriem’s view that the delivery of non-conforming goods is excusable 
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under Article 79, is the correct interpretation which should be adopted. 372 He argues that the 
way in which Article 79 is worded does not suggest a limitation as to what would constitute an 
impediment.373 Furthermore I had added that the use of the term “any” in Article 79 broadens 
the concept of “obligations”, which lead to a determination that the delivery of conforming 
goods would form part of the sellers “obligations”. Therefore the delivery of defective goods is 
contrary to the duty to deliver conforming goods under Article 35 of the CISG. Consequently 
anything that hinders this duty would be an impediment. The crux of the argument however 
falls within the clear divide between Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. 
 
With regard to Section 3 of the VCLT, there is notable divide between the textual and 
teleological approach to treaty interpretation, under Article 31 and the supplementary means of 
interpretation, which includes the travaux preparatoires, as contained in Article 32. Article 32 
is only applicable if the interpreter has already used Article 31 and arrived at an incorrect 
interpretation.  If we consider John Honnold’s very persuasive arguments that, the intention of 
the negotiating parties can be illustrated based on the preparatory works, in which it was 
decided that the delivery of non-conforming goods cannot be exempted under Article 79, we 
would find that it would fall squarely within Article 32.374 The way in which Section 3 of the 
VCLT operates would not permit such an interpretation. 
 
Furthermore, although Honnold conclusively indicates that the answer to the issue is “no”375, 
the use of the preparatory works at this stage would lead to an unfair and unreasonable 
interpretation of the CISG provisions.376 This is due to the fact that the CISG is a convention 
open to accession and consequently it would not be in the interest of parties that have acceded 
to the Convention, to be made subject to an interpretation based on a decision taken, in which 
they did not participate. Therefore the only reasonable approach could have been to find an 
interpretation based on the wording of the provision or to accept an interpretation under an 
agreement that all parties have participated in. 
 
To conclude this dissertation, the lengthy case law analysis suggests that parties will 
continually relying on Article 79 to excuse their delivery of defective goods as a defense. It is 
therefore important, that a definite answer should exist. The determination that it does, based 
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on the wording of the provision in relation to the Convention as a whole, can as a result place, 
at ease parties to a contract which finds the CISG to be the applicable law. From this point on it 
is therefore the defaulting party’s fulfillment of the requirements as contained in Article 79(1) 
that will determine his success. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
After a thorough analysis of the topic and the issue at hand, the author believes that, there are 
essentially four vital recommendations that can be made.  
 
According to a determination made under the dissertation, the only thing that hold binding 
authority is the CISG itself. Which means that all other authorities hold nothing more than 
persuasive value. This holds true with regard to the courts and arbitral bodies, however despite 
this, I believe that these bodies hold a little more persuasive value, than for instance, the CISG-
AC or the works of other scholarly authors. Hence the first, two recommendations have to be 
directed at these judicial bodies.  
 
With regard to the first recommendation, I believe that these bodies should take a more 
proactive approach in respect of any interpretations made. I base this, on the case law 
analysis.377 The analysis shows that when the issue became apparent, the courts would 
acknowledge that the required interpretation had not been done and then consequently hedged 
around it in order to resolve the case.378 I believe that, despite the fact that they merely hold 
persuasive authority, the interpretative issue should be discussed every time and consequently 
the culmination of multiple persuasive interpretations will eventually lead to the correct 
interpretation that could be considered binding. Furthermore it is their responsibility to engage 
with an interpretation which will be considered by other judicial bodies, if not done, the 
interpretative issue will remain open.  
 
The second recommendation concerns the length of a courts or tribunal’s discussion on the 
issues. Courts and arbitral tribunals should not forget that they are interpreting international law 
and as a result interpretations should be thoroughly discussed. I acknowledge that the length of 
a judgment, differs according to the jurisdiction from which it comes, however when 
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interpreting the CISG they should remember that they are writing interpretative judgments that 
will increase the worlds understanding of the provisions. 
 
The third recommendation is directed at the contracting parties to the CISG. As stated earlier in 
the dissertation, the Convention would greatly benefit from an interpretative body that holds 
binding authority.379 Furthermore, I add that commonly, most interpretative bodies are in the 
form of international courts however, an international court is not necessary because the CISG 
already has an advisory council.380  This council holds the responsibility of clarifying the 
relevant provisions.381 Additionally, despite the fact that they operate as an official body, they 
are essentially an unofficial interpretive body.382 Therefore my recommendation is to make the 
CISG-AC an official interpretative body, with the capacity to provide binding interpretations. 
In order to do this I believe that all the contracting parties to the CISG should provide one 
representative to form part of a new CISG-AC. The act of each member selecting a 
representative should ensure that an interpretation is made which is fair to and considers all 
contracting parties. Furthermore, with regard to the binding nature of their interpretation, I 
believe that in order to make their interpretations conform to the principle of ‘good faith’ as 
contained within Article 7(1) of the CISG, interpretations made by this new advisory council, 
should be made effective by way of consensus. This will ensure an interpretation which is fair 
to all contracting parties. 
 
The final recommendation seeks to provide an alternative way of clarifying the meaning of the 
provision of the CISG. This recommendation will illustrate a tool that is at the disposal of the 
contracting parties to the CISG. This tool is embodied in Article 31 of the VCLT.383 
 
The parties should create an agreement as to the interpretation of a provision. Consequently, 
Article 31 will allow for the importation of this agreement into the interpretation. This is an 
easy alternative way for the contracting parties to clarify a meaning of a provision that they 
have decided upon. According to Article 31(3)(a), the parties are allowed to create any 
subsequent agreements which relate to the interpretation of the Convention. This holds an 
overwhelming amount of value as essentially, such an agreement will be read together within 
context of the CISG. Basically, this would mean that, an interpretation under such an 
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agreement would be imported into the ordinary meaning of the terms and would then constitute 
the new meaning.  As stated before this is a valuable alternative at the contracting party’s 
disposal.   
 
The importance of these recommendations cannot be underestimated. It is the belief of the 
author that if due consideration is given to these four recommendations, the interpretation of 
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